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CHAPTER I
Materials and Methods for a Grassroots Study of Populism
in lllinois

The Populist Party was, in many respects, the most successful
third party in American histocy.

Populist efforts in the election of 1892

climaxed nearly a quarter century of agrarian unrest and marked the
culmination of agitation by farm organizations demanding sweeping social,
economic, and political reforms.

For these reasons, and because Populism

was representative of a general social upheaval during the late nineteenth
century, the movement has attracted attention from several prominent
scholars and from countless lesser figures

•

John D. Hick's seminal work
.

The Populist Revolt, written in 1931, is perhaps the best known survey.
effort.

However, more recent works such as Norman Pollack's The

Populist Response to Industrial American (New York, 1962) and Walter T . K.
Nugent's The Tolerant Populists, Kansas Populism and Nativism (Chicago,
1963) although more specialized, are also acclaimed as significant studies.
Although not dealing exclusively with Populism, C. Vann Woodward,
Richard Hofstadter, Chester McArthur Destler, and more recently Paul
Kleppner, have produced books attracting considerable notice.

1

Older,

2

narrower, but well-known research by Hicks and by Hallie Farmer has been
widely read and frequently cited. 1
Yet while these works are not by any means over-rated, and while
they certainly deserve the reputation they enjoy, a great void exists in
Populist historiography.

Most existing works on Populism might be called

"macro-studies . " They examine the movement as a social and economic
phenomenon with political manifestations on state and national levels.

Other

studies deal with relationships between the Populists and economic institutions
such as the railroads or labor unions, or with the effects of physical conditions like soil type, rainfall, and agricultural production on agrarian discontent.

The great oversight in traditional Populist historiography has been

a widespread neglect of the movement on a grassroots level.
A general trend toward "history from the bottom up" has recently
developed i n American historical writing. Works written in such a vein
usually deal with a variety of local, social, economic, and political conditions.
The basic theory behind such research is that it can uncover at least as much

•

truth about American development as can studies of state or national leaders
and their handiwork. 2 Furthermore, when speaking of social or economic
1 . The works referred to are: C. Vann Woodward, Tom Watson: A g rarian
Rebel (New York, 1 938), and Origins of the New South (Baton Rouge. 1951);
Richard Hofstadter. Age of Reform, From Bryan to F. D . R . (New York, 1955);
Chester McArthur Destler, American Radicalism, 1865-1901 (New London,
1946); Paul Kleppner, The Cross of Culture: A Social Analysis of Midwestern
Politics, 1850-1900 (New York, 1970); The journal articles by Hicks and
Farmer are noted in the bibliography of this paper.
2. For example, although this work is unrelated to this study, Stephen
Thernstrom in Poverty and Progress: Social Mobility in a Nineteenth Century City:
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history especially, it i s doubtful that any compo site national American
development exists.

Social and economic trends vary, if only by degree,

from place to place across the nation.

However, grassroots research

has provided some interesting insights about typical segments of American
society.
One o f the motives behind this study is to provide a start toward writing
the history of the Populist Movement in Illinois "from the bottom up. "

Its

focus will be both economic and demographic, comparing areas which showed
significant Populist strength in the election of 1892 to one another and to
areas which did not show such strength.
The Populists did not win i n any Ulinois counties in 1892 and, according
to existing records, carried townships in only three counties--Pike County,
on the Mississippi River north of St. Louis; Shelby County, in the east
central section of the state; and Marion County, in the heart of southern
Ulinois. 3

Sufficient tax records do not exist in Shelby County to carry out

the kind of grassroots analysis this study undertakes.

However, ample source

material i s available for Marion and Pike counties. 4

In addition to tax records,

discovered that for Newberryport, Connecticut� at least, social mobility among
the laboring class was nonexistant.

Even intergenerational mobility was slight.

Thernstrom 's evidence seems to indicate that the Horatio Alger image of
opportunity in mid-nineteenth century America has little if any veracity .

Since

Thernstrom 's pioneering effort other historians, mainly studying urban
America, have utilized similar approaches to their topics.
3.

The state total for Illinois, and a breakdown of the returns by counties,

for 1892, i s found i n a document compiled by the Illinois Secretary of State,
Offi cial Vote o f the State of Illinois Cast at the General Election Held November 8,
1892

{Springfield,
4.

l}

Ill.: H. W. Rokker, State Printer and Binde , pp. 1-2.
Both tax assessors' books and tax collectors' books exist for most

townships in Marion and Pike counties in 1892.

However only collectors' books

4
this study relies upon newspapers for the counties being examined, census
tabulations for 1870 through 1890, the original population schedules for the
Tenth Census, county atlases and plat books, county directories, and county
histories--plus, of course, numerous secondary sources.
Several obstacles, some maj o r and some minor, were encountered in
the course of this research.

Compiling and tabulating raw data from county

materials was a difficult and challenging operation.
notoriously inaccurate.

Tax records proved

Assessors' computations were sometimes erroneous

and illustrated a high level of arithmetic incompetence.
worse and presented even greater problems .

But spelling was

Mistakes i n assessors' tab-

ulations were relatively easy to spot and correct.

However, spelling errors

involved judgements on whether two names were, in reality, one person.

If

a man owned real estate in several different sections of a township, his name
might be spelled differently each time it was listed in the tax book.

Further-

more, even if a surname was spelled consistantly throughout the book, the
first name was often in so many forms that the tabulation of data was some,

what speculative.

For example, the tax on a tract of land might be assessed

to James W. Nelson.

Subsequent assessments on other property might be

assigned to James Nelson and to J. W . Nelson. Were these three names one
survived in Shelby County, the third candidate for study. Collectors' books
show only the amount of tax assessed and paid, and do not divide real estate
holdings into improved and unimproved acreage as assessors' books do.
Neither do collectors' books categorize personal property holdings. Thus
very little worthwhile analysis can be conducted from them, and, for this
reason, it was decided to bypass a township study in Shelby County.

5
individual owning several pieces of real estate, or were they more than one
person, perhaps relatives of the first?

Sometimes personal property

listings at the end of the assessor's book, and township plats, if they were
drawn around 1892, were helpful in making such judgements.
Another probl.em related to the use of tax records was that residents
reporting no personal property holdings were not on the townships' personal
property tax lists.

This omission meant a tenant farmer with no personal

property, such as household furnishings, livestock, or agricultural implements-
items which might conceivably be furnished by the landlord--would appear
nowhere on the tax rolls.

On the other hand a man owning and farming a

small piece of land yet so poor he had no personal property to rep ort, would
appear to be a non-resident landowner.

Therefore, no way exists to deter-

mine the exact number of residents, and henc.e , the total adult male population-
the number of potential voters--in each township.

If manuscripts for the

Eleventh Census were available, an exact figure could be easily established.
Unfortunately the original schedules for the Eleventh Census were almost
totally destroyed by fire and are not on microfilm.

Furthermore, schedules

of the Twelfth Census (1900), supposed to be released in the spring of 1971,
are still unavailable.
Census, taken in 1880.

The only source of raw demographic data is the Tenth
Since this material is separated by twelve years from

the period being studied, the research situation is less than ideal.
it is doubtful that any ideal situation exists.

However,

Scholars are often plagued with

inadequacies in their source materiials--lapses in data, inac�uracy of data,

6
and conflicting information from different sources, to name a few of the more
If historians are to produce any scholarship, they must

common problems.

not let these obstacles overwhelm them.

They must use what they have,

and try to make the best of it.
Fortunately, detailed, multi-volume compllations of the Tenth, Eleventh,
and Twelfth Censuses are extant.
demographic data.

These resources provide a variety of

Some of the available statistics useful to this study

include: age distribution of male residents, by counties; population by race
and sex, by counties; number and nativity of foreign born, by counties; and
population by minor civil divisions.

This material, used in addition to the

demographic data present in the tax books, and from the microfilm census
schedules for 1880, provide enough evidence to facilitate reasonably accurate
estimates about the size and characteristics of the electorate in the areas under
examination.

The tax records and the census volumes on agriculture, and on

wealth, debt, and taxation provide a source of data useful for the economic
analysis in this study.
Selecting the areas for examination was a two step process.

Since the

ultimate goal of this procedure was to uncover instances of Populist strength
at the township level, search methods were aimed at minimizing its difficulty.
The only available source of township election returns are 1892 newspapers,
one for each county.

However examining the election returns for every county

would be a time-consuming process·with a relatively small reward.

Thus the

first step was to identify those counties where the Peoples Party experienced

7
some degree of success.

In twelve counties, mostly in southern Illinois, the

Populists polled over ten percent of the presidential votes--the figure arbitrarily
established as the minimum boundary for counties to be further investigated.
However, 1892 newspapers no longer exist for five of these twelve counties, and
in four more the election summaries show only a strong widespread level of
political discontent, but no township falling into the Populist column--leaving
three counties with potential for grassroots analysis. 5
The townships studied in Marion and Pike counties were chosen according
to the degrees of political partisanship they exhibited.

All townships were

studied where the Populist national ticket received more votes than the
presidential candidates of both major parties.

Any township where the Populists

outpolled one of the major parties afoo was subjected to analysis.

As a control,

the two townships in each county where the Republicans and Democrats achieved
their largest percentages also were included.

Thus, in a sense, the "most"

Populist, "most" Democratic, and ''most" Republican townships were studied.
Also included were townships which did not meet any of the above criteria, but
where voting pattern were interesting--such as in one Marion County township
which the Democrats carried but where the Populists came within three votes
of equaling the Republican total.
In all, twelve townships were analyzed in this study.

Several economic

and demographic variables were examined to determine just what possible
5.

William E. Keller, ed. , Newspapers in the Illinois State Historical

Library (Springfield, Ill. : Illinois State Historical Library, n. d . ) .

News

papers covering the 1892 election do not exist.for 30 of Illinois' 102 counties.

8
relationship they had, if any, to Populism in 1892.

Some of the factors

considered were: degree of land improv�ment and mechanization of agri
culture, land value, rate of tenancy versus land ownership, and population
variables.

These factors were not only examined for 1892 but changes in

them over time were measured.

Furthermore, since most probably no

single factor explains the incidence of Populism in those townships, variables
which seemed to be related were compared to one another.
Two additional things would have been helpful to this study--a computer
and a knowledge of the statistical techniques to make it useful.

While the

methodological level of this work is not quantitatively sophisticated, it improved
a s time passed.

However lack of technical knowledge and the lack of a computer

prevented simultaneous consideration of more than two variables when more than
two factors may have worked together to promote agrarian discontent.

Multi

variate analysis may be needed to explain the existance of Populist enclaves.
Chapter Two of this study is a brief survey of the national Populist
movement.

Chapter Three deals with agrarian discontent in Illinois.

The

fourth chapter analyzes counties showing some degree of Populist strength.
The two following chapters descend to the township level.

C hapter Seven assesses

the demographic factors rela ted to voting behavior, and the final chapter provides
an overview and reassessment of the Populist movement in Illinois.

CHAPTER II
From Bacon to Bryan: A Brief Survey of Agrarian Discontent

Agriculture is America's oldest and in many ways her most honored
occupation.

Few important figures in American history have denounced the

farmer, nor have they repudiated his role as a pillar in the economic structure
of this nation.

For a great many years during the early history of the United

States, agriculture was the foundation of the American economy, and farmers
were collectively accorded a degree of respect by many persons who accepted
Thomas Jefferson's admiration for the yoeman farmer as the example of frugality,
industry, and purity.

Yet farmers themselves have seldom attached much

significance to their laudation, emphasizing instead what they perceive to b e an
economic condition less than commensurate with their supposed importance to
the health and well-being of the nation.
Agrarian discontent in the United States is almost as old as American
agriculture.

Major rural uprisings date back to 1676 when Nathaniel Bacon led

a thousand back-country pioneers against the government of colonial Virginia .
A century later, i n 1786, Captain Daniel Shays led a band of impoverished
western Massachusetts farmers against the state government and the "mo�ey
power. " In 1794, the farmers of western Pennsylvania, motivated by similar
economic concerns, defied the newly created federal government and were
crushed by an overwhelming army of 13, 000 men.

9
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Rural politics in the nineteenth century, while generally less violent,
was much more influential to American history.

Land hunger, coming chiefly

from the western United States,· was a major factor driving America to war in
1812 and again in 1846.

Although some scholars are beginning to question the

role rural America played in the election of Andrew Jackson in 1828, most
historians still agree the farm vote was a major factor in creating a new era in
American politics.
After the Civil War, agrarian discontent once again played an important
role in shaping America.

Farm organizations like the Patrons of Husb andry ·

and the Farmers' Alliances on occasion worked for economic reforms and for
controls on Big Business.

The Grangers, for example, successfully agitated

during the 1870's and 1880's for passage of legislation aimed at regulating the
railroads--legislation which ultimately led to creation of the Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC).
political process.

Post-Civil War farmers also played an active ·roll in the
Both the Greenback Party and the Populist Party were

primarily agrarian movements.

While by no means successful political organ

izations, these parties could claim some accomplishments.

The Populists,: in

particular, were the most successful third party in American history, electing
several western governor s , senators, and congressmen in 1892 and 1894.
Although the �opulists did not accomplish their- long range goals, they did help
bring about a major redirection within the Democratic Party in 1896.
At the end of the American Revolution, Jefferson expressed the hope that
the nation would always be dominated by agriculture, qepending on Europe for

11
manufactured products.

In antebellum America it seemed that Jefferson's

hopes would be realized, as the agricultural frontier moved westi.vard.

�

In

the 1850's farmers poured out of the Ohio Valley into the sparsely settled areas
west of the Mississippi River.

During the decade before the Civil War, the

population of Minnesota multiplied by twenty-nine.

The population of Missouri

doubled, and in Iowa it tripled, while in Nebraska, Kansas and Dakota territories
grew from almost nothing to 107, 000,

29, 000 and 5, 000 respectively. 1 But
·

by 1850, American industry had already challenged agriculture and by 1900,
the farmer was of only secondary importance to the nation�s economy.

Census

figures for 1860 indicate that three fifths of the persons in the United States lived
on farms.

However, it would be

By 1900, this figure declined to one third,

erroneous to conclude farming was

a

dying way of life after the Civil War.

Even

though the weight of population distribution shifted against agriculture, the total
farm population continued to climb between 1870 and 1900; the most striking
growth again occurred in the trans-Mississippi West.

2

Thus, while the agrarian

population did not grow nearly as fast as urban America and while E astern agriculture was on a slow general decline, the rapid settlement of new territory and
improved farming methods continued to make rural areas a vital part of American
life.
The agricultural boom which swept the trans-Mississippi West after the
Civil War resulted from two main factors, railroads and cheap land.
1.

Fred A. Shannon, The Farmers' Last Frontier: Agriculture,
1860-1897 ( New York: Harper and Row, 1945), p. 33.
2. Ibid, pp. 349-52.

The opening
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of this vast unsettled expanse of Western land was itself closely related to
railroad development of the area.

Although the idea of railroads in the West

was an old one, the Civil War delayed implementation of any specific construction
plans.

After the war, western railroads were constructed with government

assistance, either by cash grants or by gifts of land--alternating sections along
the railroads' right-of-way which it sold to settlers to repay construction costs.
Both the railroads and territorial or state legislatures encouraged
settlement and attempted to destroy myths which had created an unfavorable
image of the West as the Great American Desert.

Each western state had an

immigratinn board, and many counties employed immigration commissioners.
Towns and cities through chambers of commerce, real estate boards, and other
similar organizations industriously presented the claims of their localities.

They

published pamphlets in a variety of languages and distributed them throughout
the United States and in Europe.

They encouraged foreign immigration and in

the 1870's eastern depressions speeded the rate at which the discontented
moved westward, lured by the propaganda of railroad agents and other western
boosters.

3

Perhaps a bigger lure than conditions in the East or in Europe was the
availability of western land.

Railroads purposely kept land prices low,

preferring to make their money from business the settlers would give them,
3 . Solon Justus Buck, The Granger Movement, A Study of Agricultural
Organization and Its Political, Economic, and Social Manifestations, 1870-1880,
Bison Books (Lincoln, Neb. : University of Nebraska Press, 1969), p. 5, and
Hallie Farmer, "The Economic Background of Frontier Populism," Mississippi
Valley Historical Review, X (March, 1924), pp. 406, 409.
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rather than from the sale of land to those settlers.

Railroads reasoned that

low land prices would speed settlement.and would be more beneficial in the
long run.
easy.

Furthermore, not only were railroad land prices low, terms were

The Kansas Pacific, for example, refunded a percentage of passage

money to immigrants who purchased land.

The Union Pacific offered credit.

Settlers paid one-tenth of the total price at the time of sale, but the rest could
be deferred over eleven years at seven percent interest.
three years, only the interest had to be paid.

However, for the first

If the buyer purchased his land

over a shorter period, a reduction was made in the price.

Much cheaper

public land was also available under the Homestead Act, Preemption Act, and
Timber Culture Act, although once the railroads came through, it did not last
long, except in the arid western plains regions.

Even so, between 1860 and

1900 about 400, 000 families got such land and kept it for themselves. 4
As public land vanished, and as railroad land fell into the hands of
speculators, a boom developed. Increasing prosperity in the West caused
capital to move in that direction.

Good crop yields a �d high prices encouraged

many Easterners to invest their money in western mortgages.

Furthermore,

as cheap la�d became more scarce, the need for borrowed money became
greater.

Interest rates were attractive to the potential investor, ranging from

six to ten percent on real estate and from ten to eighteen percent on chattel
4. Shannon, Farmers' Last Frontier, p. 55, Farm�r, ''Background of
Frontier Populism," p. 407, and John D. Hicks, The Populist Revolt, A History
of the Farmers' Alliance and the People's Party, Bison Books (Lincoln, Neb . :
University of Nebraska Press, 1961), pp. 1-18.

14
mortgages.

Since profit was to be made from mortgage loans, and since

western prosperity made these loans seem safe, investors were plentiful.
So were borrowers, many of whom were expanionist and extravagant in the
face of easy credit and overmortgaged their property.
was greater among lenders than among borrowers.

However, competition

5

Even those farmers who homesteaded public land needed capital.

It has

been estimated that during the 1850's it cost a minimum of a thousand dollars,
i n addition to the cost of the land, to bring forty acres of Illinois ground into
production.
There is no reason to believe that farm-making costs diminished
after settlement crossed the Missouri. The ·geographer classifies
eastern Kansas and Nebraska as prairie county, much akin to
Illinois. As settlement moved into the plains country of central
and western Kansas and Ne raska, the "cash capital costs" of
settlement probably rose.

e

On the plains frame or log houses cost more, as did fencing. In Illinois
a farmer generally obtained his water from a nearby stream or, at worst,
from a shallow well.
plains.

Deeper and more costly wells were necessary on the

Even fuel was a problem there.

The only satisfactory substitute for

wood was coal, which had to be purchased from the railroad station.
farms required more machinery.

�

Plains

Only by using larger horse-drawn machines

could the plains soil b worked while its moisture content was adequate.
5.
Money at
(Lincoln,
6.
7.

7

An extensive discussion of farm financing is found i n Alan G. Bogue,
Interest: The Farm Mortgage on the Middle Border, Bison Books
Neb. : University of Nebraska Press, 1961), pp. 1-18.
Ibid, p. 2.
Ibid, p. 3, and Farmer, "Background of Frontier Populism, " p. 411.
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Thus, through easy credit, agricultural machinery, and plentiful
land, the West developed.

Yet each of the factors which aided and encouraged

expansion of agriculture also worked to the eventual detriment of the farmer.
Chief among these detrimental factors, and related to most of them, was the
railroad.
The railroad benefited the farmer by supplying cheap land for settlement
and by providing transportation into undeveloped areas.

However this benefit

was often a mixed blessing, for it induced development of some areas of only
marginal agricultural value, where settlement should not have occurred.
Potential settlers were, of course, concerned about problems other than
Indians, wild animals, and disease.

They knew about agricultural necessities

such as the amount of rainfall, length of the growing season, and the availability
-

of building materials.

But nowhere in the West, except in the mountainous

areas, is there an abrupt break between regions.
one another.

They gradually fade into

So while one area m i ght have adequate rainfall, another place

a hundred miles from it may not--and in some parts of the West the diJference
of a few inches in rainfall, or of a few weeks when it occurs, can have a
pronounced effect on the crop which can be grown.

8

Railroads linked the rural farmer with the industrial areas of the East.
Coupled with easy credit, this link enabled him to purchase machinery to
work his holding and to increase its production.

However, the expense of

machinery reduced the percentage of farm owners and increased the percentage·
8.

Shannon, Farmers' Last Frontier, p.

21.
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of tenants and workers.

The farmer who during prosperous times purchased

such machinery on credit often damaged himself in the same way as one who
overextended in expanding his landholdings.

During hard times he was as

readily a victim of financial disaster as were those persons too poor or
unprogressive to acquire the new implements, and as were others who had
expanded operations too rapidly during the brief periods of prosperity.

All

"soon joined the ranks of the victims of the land monopolists, those remaining
on the land no longer being free agents. "

9

The same railroads which opened up new areas to settlement and carried
agricultural machinery to those areas also carried the crops back to m arket.
Opening up new fertile western lands, creating more farms and f armers
(including many i�migrants), mechanizing agriculture, and giving formerly
remote areas access to markets resulted in tremendous overproduction.
prices hit rock bottom in the years after the Civil War.

Farm

Farmers countered

this trend by producing more, not seeing overproduction at the root of their
problems.

For example, while production of such staple crops as corn, wheat,

and cotton increased from

1866 to 1880 in acreage planted, in bushels produced,

and in total value, the price per bus el declined just as steadily. lO

h

When the

evils of overproductim were presented to farmers, they refused to accept
that explanation, preferring instead to blame others for rural problems.
9.

10.

Shannon, Farmers' Last Frontier, p.
Ibid., pp.

146.

291-303, Buck, Granger Movement, pp. 24-34 and Hicks,

Populist Revolt, pp. 54-58.

Both Shannon and Buck provide numerous graphs

and tables detailing and illustrating the above-mentioned trends.
to the pages cited in Shannon, see pages 415 and

In addition

417 in the Appendix.
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Railroads and rate abuses became chief targets of the farmers' frustration.
Since railroads sold their federal Land grants at low prices to make profit from
the carrying trade which would develop as those grants were settled and put
into production, controve rsial practices developed.

To avoid becoming mere

trunk lines, shipping a farmer's crop to a city where it could be transferred to
a cheaper competitive carrier, railroads often charged the same price, or
more, for a short haul as they did for carrying the produce all the way to
market.

Thus a farmer could not save any money by transferring his cargo

enroute.

Furthermore, shipping rates between local points west of Chicago,

where the vast expanse of land often c aused one road to have a monopoly in an
area, were much greater than such rates i n the East, where competition existed
between carriers.
Another monopolistic factor was the trend toward consolidation of line s ,
and hence, toward less competition.

This pattern too was especially common

i n the West and was partly because many western lines, financially unstable
like farmers, took advantage of boom periods and became insolvent during hard
times.

Such companies were absorbed by more successful and more wisely

managed lines.
Stock-watering was another evil vigorously condemned in rural America.
By increasing the paper value of the company, the railroad management raised
the ceiling on its limits of indebtedness.

Since most farmers believed that

�

railroad funds came from bond issues ra her than stock sales, and that
railroads charged high rates to pay off these bonds while they passed out stock

18
for nothing, farmers were most vocal in their objections to such .
behavior.
Farmers vociferously opposed railroads giving rebates to preferred
volume customers, since this practice caused the lines to concentrate their
attention and services in large towns, at the eArpense of small ones.

Rebates

also widened the economic gap between prosperous and successful farmers
and the poor ones.
fav()ritism shown

Farmers hated such trends, and also objected to the
by railroads' free passes to government officials.

Radicals

suspected such practices compromised the position of these officials and allowed
them to tolerate railroad abuses.

Aggravating these grievences was the fact

that many western areas had actually floated bonds and assumed a public indebt
edness to help the railroads in their infancy--and had been abused in return.
Combined with railroad abuses were artifically low crop prices, due not
only to overproduction, but accomplished indirectly through undergrading the
farmers' grain at the elevators where it was loaded.

When the elevator

operators sold the grain at its true grade, and for a higher price at m.arket,
they realized a large profit, part of which rightfully belonged to the farmers.
The railroads permitted, and even condoned, such practices by forcing farmers
to use particular elevators.

Many times. the companies would not provide cars

for any loading operation except at particular elevators.

In other instances

the railroads granted elevator operators monopolies along the right-of-way,
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or even owned the elevators themselves.
take what was offered to him.

I n such cases, the farmer had to

11

Despite such conditions, westward migration continued.
boom was at its height.

By 1887 the

The West w a s overpopulated and far more capital

had been invested there than could ever be returned.
the bubble burst and the collapse came.
the reaction was sudden and swift.

At the height of the boom,

In some areas, such as in Kansas,

In others, the decline was more gradual.

But in the entire trans-Mississippi West prosperity vanished and did not
return for a decade.
The immediate cause of the collapse was drought, resulting i n widespread ·
crop failure.

In only two of the ten years between 1887 and 1897 did the western

states attain their normal average rainfall.

In five of the dry years, the drought

was so severe that it caused almost total crop failure.
wheat i n Kansas could be harvested.

In 1887, only half the

In certain areas of the Dakotas the wheat

crop averaged only 1. 72 bushels per acre in 1889.

Settlers in some Nebraska

counties harvested no crop at all between 1887 and 1894.

In 1894, sixty-one of

the ninety-one Nebraska counties produced no crop whatsoever.

12

Further aggr avating the farmers' plight was further declines in crop
prices, as farm lands to the east, unaffected by drought, continued to produce.
Corn which sold for sixty-three cents a bushel in 1881 dropped to twenty-eight
Hicks, Populi s t Revolt, pp. · 60-78, Buck, Granger Movement,
pp. 9-19, and Hallie F armer, "The Railroads and Frontier Populism,"
11.

Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XIII (December, 1926), pp. 387-97.
12.

Farmer, "Economic Background of Frontier Populism," pp. 416-18. :

..
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cents in 1890.

The

price of wheat fell from $1. 19 a bushel in 1881 to

for ty-nine cents in 1894.

In fact, during the lean years in the West per acre

production costs exceeded the selling prices for both of these grains.

13

The financial problems of western settlers during the late Eighties and
the early Nineties were even more severe because most farme rs were heavily
mortgaged.

The mortgage debt of the western states equalled one-fourth the

value of all their farm land.

·

There were counties in Kansas and South Dakota
.

where ninety percent of the land was mortgaged.

14

Farmers whose crops were taken by the drought could not make interest
payments on their mortgages and lost their farms.

In Kansas alone, over

eleven thousand farm mortgages were foreclosed between 1889 and 1893, and
in fifteen counties loan companies owned seventy-five to ninety-five percent
of the land by 1895.

In addition, much land was forfeited and vacated without

the formality of foreclosure, as thousands of families abandoned their farms to
return east.

E i ghteen thousand prairie schooners crossed the Missouri River

to Omaha in 1891.

Entire towns melted away.

15

Emigration was most pronounced in the western sections of the affected
states.

While Nebraska showed a slight population gain between 1890 and 1900,

thirty-five counties lost over sixty-seven thousand persons.
13.

Raymond

South Dakota

F a rmer, "Economic Background of Frontier Populism," p. 418, and

C. Miller, "The Background of Populism in Kansas," The Mississ ippi

Valley Historical Review, XI (March, 1925), p. 476.
14.

Farmer, ''Economic Background of Frontier Populism," pp. 4 1 9 , 420

and Miller, ''Background of Populism in Kansas," pp. 476-79.
15.

Farmer, "Economic Background of Frontier Populism, 11pp. 420-22·,

and Shannon, Farmers' Last Frontier, pp. 307, ,308.
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experienced a similar situation.

While the state was gaining 2, 167 persons ,

twenty-six counties lost 30, 4 98 people.

Twelve western counties s uffered

half the state los s , two counties losing half their population.

16

Against this background the agrarian reform movement took on a new
urgency.

Although active farmers' groups had existed since the early years

after the Civil War, they now became more numerous and more political in
their aims.
The first of the important farm organizations after the Civil War was the
National Grange or, a s it was also known, the Patrons of Husbandry.

Founded

in 1867, the Grange organized around the premise that farmers suffered from
an inferior social, political, and intellectual position in American society.
Farmers sensed their position as tillers of the soil had suffered a rapid decline
i n status.

However, they also knew this decline was not so much a direct one

on the part of farmers as it was due to the rapid increase in advantages for those
engaged in other occupations.

In an era of budding business organizations,

m anufacturers' associations, and trade unions, farmers realized the need for
organization and for presenting a united front i n their own defense.

17

The National Grange worked toward all these ends, and the original social
and educational features of the Grange were soon secondary to its economic and
political activities.

These included cooperative stores and grain elevators, and

even an attempt to manufacture their own agricultural machinery.
16.
17.
18.

18

But Granger

Farmer, "Econom i c Background of Frontier Populism,�' pp. 420-22.
Buck, The Granger Movement, pp. 34-39.
Ibid�, pp. 360-70.
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activity against the railroads was the organization's most significant and most
successful attempt to improve the farmers' situation.
Working on the state level, the Grange waged a successful campaign
against railroad abuses in Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, and Wisconsin, and, to a
lesser degree, in several other states, In general, the Granger Laws, as
they were c alled, aimed at regulating railroad freight rates, passenger fares,
and grain warehouses and ele_vators.

While the rate provisions were invariably

repealed and replaced by more innocuous legislation prohibiting only rate
discrimination, and although all such regulations were universally opposed
by the carriers, railroad rates did iin fact decline during the height of Granger
.
19
a ctiv1'ty.
The success of the National Grange and the deplorable condition of
agriculture gave rise to numerous farm organizations.
significant of these were the Farmers' Alliances.

Among the most

Like the Grange, the

Farmers' Alliances were a loosely knit confederation of state and local groups.
Lacking cohesive central leadership, the Alliances became constantly involved
i n internal squabbles and in factional differences.
important goals for the farm movement.

Yet they accomplished some

The . Farmers' Alliances heavily

involved themselves in cooperative economic movements.

These operations

went far beyond the farm store and grain elevator activities of the Grange.
The Southern Alliance attempted a huge cooperative effort to control both
19.

Buck, The Granger Movement, pp. 124-238, passim.
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selling of crops and purchase of farm supplies. In this regard, the Farmers'
Alliance Exchange was organized.

At first this organization merely pooled

the grain of individual members and, for a commission, attempted to c1cmand
a fair price.

It also tried to save farmers money on agricultural implements

by purchasing machinery in quantity, passing on to individual farmers the
s avings realized.

However the Exchange was undone when it schemed to provide

its own credit to Alliance members and instead provided for its own financial
.

ruin.

20

During the height of Alliance activity and, not coincidently, during the
depth of farm depression, the agrarian reform movement took on definate
political overtones.

While the farm organiz ations did not repudiate third

party movements, they viewed the political allegience of individual members
as a matter of personal decision.

Although many former Grangers and members

of other farm protest groups had supported the Greenback Party in

1878 ,

no agrarian organization had officially and openly called upon its membership
to abandon the two major parties.

Both the Grange and the Farmers' Alliances

originally planned to work within the two party system and ultimately expected
to capture one, hopefully the Democratic, by placing farmer candidates on its
ticket, and by then electing them to high public office. 21
By

1890,

farm organizations began to perceive this plan of action was

not working out.
20.
21.

This feeling was due in part to the frustrations of a continuing

Hicks, Populist Revolt, pp. 133-39.
Ibid. , pp. 96, 141-42, 147-49.
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agricultural depression and to a consequent impatience with the p ainfully
slow rate of ch ange which farmers felt necessary to improve their condition.
They came to believe that members of their ranks who had been sent as agrarian
representatives to Congress or to the Senate were being corrupted by a party
system which was inherently evil and hopelessly dominated by greedy eastern
cap1• t al"is ts.

22

The idea of uniting not only the various farm groups, but also labor unions
in an effort to capture for the poor working people some power and voice in the
federal government was discussed in National Alliance meetings in both
and

1889.

1888

The formal presentation of a plan for a third party took place at a .

National Alliance meeting i n December

1890 at Ocala, Florida.

However, the

idea of a third party was not well received by all factions present at the Ocala
meeting.

Southerners feared such a move would destroy the white supremecist

one-party system in their section and that a split in the ranks of white farmers
would augment the power of southern blacks.

Still others present at Ocala

retained confidence in the ability of a united farm bloc to capture the national
Democratic Party in

1892.

However Northern Alliance members, buoyed by

radical representatives from the drought-ridden and devastated trans-Mississippi
West, generally favored a third party movement.

23

At the annual meeting of the Northern Alliance held at Omaha, Nebraska
the following month, six fundamental demands were presented.
22.

Hicks, Populist Revolt, pp.

23.

John Hicks, "The Birth of the Populist Party , "

IX (S19ptember, 1928), pp. 226· -28.

The most

151-52.
Minnesota History�
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important of these called for free silver; government ownership of railroads
and telegraphs; abolition of national banks and substitution of direct paper note
issues; direct election of the president, vice president, and senators; and the
secret ballot.

24

The debate over a third party came to a head in Cincinnati in May, 1 8 9 1 .
Delegates from all states and of all politic a1 persuasions descended upon the
Cincinnati meeting, but it was dominated by western radicals and by "professional"
third-party men.

A major conflict emerged at the meeting between the faction

led by Ignatius Donnelly of Minnesota, who wanted to form a third party on the
spot, and the group led by James B. Weaver of Iowa, who wanted only to
draft resolutions, but who held out the possibi lity of a third party i f neither
the Republicans nor the Democrats proved responsive to the resolutions produced.
The result of the conflict was a. compromise.

�

The convention formed the People

Party and its executive committee w a s directed to attend a proposed conference
of reform organizations in St. Lou is in February, 1892.

I f possible, the

committee was . to enlist these other organizations in a united political effort.
I f this arrangement could not be made, the committee was directed to call

a

national convention by June 1, 1892 to name a presidential ticket, and the
Populists would go it alone.

25

In November of 1891, the executive committee of the Populist Party
visited the meeting of the Southern Alliance supreme council.
24 .

Hicks, "The Birth of the Populist Party,

25.

Hicks, Populist Revolt, pp. 2 1 1 - 1 6 .

11

p. 229.

Urged by other
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reform leaders who also attended, Southern Alliance officers, although still
distressed about the possibility of splitting the white vote in their section,
adopted the Northern Alliance's wait-and-see attitude.

They instructed Alliance

congressmen to boycott party caucuses in Washington.
The decisive meeting came at St. Louis in February, 1892.

Present. were

leaders of the Alliance, the Knights of Labor, Anti-Monopolists1 Prohibitionists,
People's Party, Reform Press, and Women's Alliance.

In all, eight hundred

delegates representing twenty-one different organizations were awarded seats.
While the majority of delegates at the St. Louis convention favored a third
party, a highly vocal minority opposed such a move and threatened to bolt the
meeting if it were attempted.

To preserve harmony, the convention did nothing

more than draw up a platform, including a list of demands upon the national
government.

Having accomplished this, the convention adjourned.

However,

a majority of the delegates remained to hear Donnelly and Weaver again debate
whether or not the new party should procede before giving the two major parties
a chance to react to Populist demands.

Weaver's policy of delay was adopted .

and further action on the new party was postponed again until July
a meeting was to be held at Omaha.

4, 1892,

when

In the meantime, local organizations were

requested to meet, to ratify the St. Louis platform, and to select delegates
to state nominating conventions.
The Republican Party met at Minneapolis on June 7, 1892 and, as expected,
nominated the incumbant President Benjamin Harrison.

The Democratic National

27
Convention convened i n Chicago on June 21, nominating Grover Cleveland once
again.

Agrarian groups found little to please them in either candidate or

platform.
Meeting i n Omaha i n July, the national convention of the People's Party
experienced little difficulty in securing either a platform or a candidate.

The

platform had been constructed at the St. Louis conference, and in the interim
the leading contender for the presidential nomination, Colonel L. L. Polk,
president of the Southern Alliance died.

An attempt to draft Judge Walter Q.

Gresham of Illinois failed when he withdrew his name from consideration.

This

development meant the nomination would go by default to one of the old thirdparty leaders of the Northwest.

Since many people considered Donnelly to

be far too radical, only James B. Weaver, who had been the Greenback Party
candidate in 1880, remained.
G. Field of Virginia.

He was paired on the ticket with General James

Thus two retired generals, one Union and one Confederate,

made up the Populist ticket i n 1892.

26

The results in the November election was viewed with mixed emotion by
the Populists.

For a new party, they did very well.

By polling over a million

votes and by gaining twenty-two electoral votes, Weaver became the first
third-party candidate to break into the electoral college since the Civil War.
The People's Party presidential ticket carried the states of Colorado, Idaho,
Nevada, and Kansas.

I t lost Nebraska by less than a hundred votes.

In

26. A detailed account of the St. Louis Convention is found in Hicks,
Populist Revolt, pp. 223-37 , and in "Birth of the Populist Party, " pp. 238-47.
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addition the Populists elected governors in Kans a s , North Dakota and Colorado.
Eight to ten congressmen succeeded because of Populist support and a considerable number of others owed election to deals made with the People's Party.
Furthermore, about fifty state officials and fifteen hundred county officials

�

and state legislators gained office on the Populist tick t.

27

However, cold analysis shows that the strength of the People's Party
was not what its supporters belived it to be.

Populist victories in several

western states were accomplished only through fusion with the Democrats.
Furthermore, Populist strength in N�vada, Colorado, and Wyoming was due
more to the fact that these states had economies dependent on silver mining,
than to any popular sympathy with the Populist platform.
made no mark at all in the South, East, or Middle-West.

The People's Party
Even in his home

state of Iowa, Weaver polled less than five percent of the vote.

Failure in

the South was due in part to the presence of a complete Populist slate on the
ballot.

While white southern voters might have been willing to cast their votes

for the presidential candidate of a third party, they were not willing to destroy
the Democratic Party on the state and local levels, thus allowing a successful
black-Republican coalition,

Farmers in the East and Mid-West, unaffected

by drought, had no protest vote to register.

28
_

Events of the next few years aided the Populist cause.

Grover Gleveland,

returned to the White House in 1892, was a sound money man, and his gold
27.
28.

Hicks, The Populist Revolt, pp. 261-69.
Ibid.
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standard principles rose above all his other policies--as illustrated by events
following the Panic of 1893.

When, i n 1894, an army of jobless workers

descended on Washington, and when i n that same year federal troops were used
to break the Pullman Strike in Chicago, Cleveland did nothing except veto a bill
to coin bullion stored in the Treasury vaults, thus prolonging the deflationary
movement which was partly responsible for unemployment and labor unrest.
As might be expected under these circumstances, the Populists did well in the
midterm election of 1894, increasing their vote by fifty percent, and gathering
some labor support.

Yet the Republicans regained control in many western areas.
.

Like the Democrats, the Republicans were beginning to talk like the Populists.

29

The election of 1894 showed the Democrats that their party was losing
touch with the masses.

In the West in particular, most of their supporters

had gone over to the Republicans or the Populists. · They solved their problem
and bid for Populist support by nominating William Jennings Bryan of Nebraska
in 1896, and by adopting a free-silver plank.

While the Democratic presidential

candidate was acceptable to the PopuUsts, they could not support that party ' s
choice o f vice president, a conservative eastern banker , shipbuilder, and
railroad president, Arthur Sewall.

Instead they nominated a noted agrarian

radical, Tom Watson of Georgia.

The resulting confusion on both the ballot

and the issues allowed the election of the conservative Republican candidate,
William McKinley of Ohio.
29.

Although Bryan's 6, 468, 000 votes were more than

Shannon, Farmers! Last Frontier, p. 322.
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any candidate had previously received, and more than any Democrat would
get for the next t\venty years, the election of McKinley meant the continuation
of Cleveland's fiscal policy.
agrarian reform .
were dead.
30.

It also meant the end of any hope for meaningful

Bryan would try again but he would find the agrarian issues

30

Shannon, Farmers' Last Frontier, pp. 323-26. · ! For a more detailed

discussion of events after 1892 see Paul W. Glad, McKinley, Bryan, and the
. People (New York, J . B . Lippencott Co. , 1964)., and Robert F. Durden, The
Climax of Populism (Lexington, Ky. : University of Kentucky Press, 1966).

CHAPTER III
Agriculture and Agrarian Discontent in Illinois

Even though the People's Party showed very little strength in Illinois
in 1892, the state played a major role in the development of American agriculture and in the growth of agrarian discontent.

In many respects, events

i n the state were closely related to western conditions.

Increasing land

sales indicated that Illinois was one of the biggest population losers in the
great migration westward.

The original exodus from the state diminished

after 1876 but began anew i n 1884.

1

Railroads, big enemy of the western farmer, were s imilarly perceived
by the agrarian element of Illinois.

Long haul-short haul abuses were not

unique to the trans-Mississippi West, and even though rates declined in the
Seventies, Illinois farmers thought transportati9n charges were still too high.
In 1880, for example, it cost eighty-six cents to ship a two hundred pound hog
from Chicago to New York, or ten percent of its total value.
of wheat over the same route cost twenty cents.

To send a bushel

But, to ship that wheat only

110 miles from Rock Falls to Chicago cost ten to twelve cents.

Furthermore,

the Eastern Illinois Railroad charged the same rate for hauling produce from
Chicago to East St. Louis as it did from Chicago to Rossville, a distance only
one-third as far.
1.

As in the West, Illinois railroads "gave poor service,

Shannon, Farmers' Last Frontier, pp. 34,_ 39.
31
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weighed commodities incorrectly, cooperated with monopolistic elevators,
and outraged farmers by refusing to put up fences along the tracks or to
pay damages . "

2

Illinois farmers , like their western counterparts, suspected that free
railroad passes to officials compromised their integrity and influenced both
state legislators and members of the Illinois State Board of Railroad and
Warehouse Commissioners.

In 1885, the state board obviously favored the

railroads at the expense of the farmers.
Equally distasteful to Illinois farmers were trusts and monopolies of
all kinds.

In particular, they resented local combinations of grain buyers,

who united to hold down prices .

They held a similar attitude toward terminal

elevator operators in Chicago who were constantly accused of undergrading
wheat.

Livestock growers complained because they were charged double the

market price for feed their animals consumed in the Chicago stockyards.
Furthermore , the farmers suspected that handlers i n the yards deliberately
damaged animals so they would not bring full market price.

Not only did

farmers feel that they were being mistreated as producers, but with good
reason believed they were being taken advantage of as consumers also.

Most

implement manufacturers sold their products only through agents or county
dealers who obtained their profit by raising prices twenty-five or thirty percent.
2 . Roy V. Scott, The Agrarian Movement in Illinois 1880-1896, Illinois
Studies in the Social Sciences, Vol . 52 (Urbana, Ill. : The University of Illinois
Press, 1962).
3.

Ibid. , pp. 16, 1 7 .

3
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A more basic farm grievence was that agrarian interests were underrepresented in state government.

Although over half Illinois' population i n

1880 lived in rural areas, only fourteen of the 3 6 9 state legislators were
farmers.

Farmers felt this lack of representation meant their interests were

not being well served.

Nowhere was this disatisfaction more apparent than in

the Illinois tax system, under which farmers felt forced to shoulder a disproportionate share of the burden.

They suspected that rural property , which

was in plain sight, was more often assessed than the hard-to-find .stocks,
bonds, and safes of urban residents.

4

After 1881, falling prices accentuated these grievances.
for Illinois produce paralleled those for western crops.

Price trends

The cereal-growing

central and south portions of the state were affected as the price for corn,
wheat, and oats fell from 1881 levels of 53 cents,

$1 . 22,

and 43 cents to lows

of 1 8 cents, 45 cents, and 15 cents respectively by the mtd-1890's.

Northern

farmers and some central Illi.nois operators who raised livestock were better
off, since prices for farm animals did not decline as rapidly or as much as
prices for cereal crops.

5

Unlike the West, Illinois was unaffected by drought

and continued through the entire last half of the nineteenth century as a top
grain-producing state.

The state led the nation i n wheat production from 1859

to 1 8 7 9 , and i n corn production for every decade between 1860 and 1900 except
the Eighties.

6

4.

Scott, The Agrarian Movement in Illinois 1880-1896, p. 19.

5.

Shannon, Farmers' Last Frontier, pp. 296, 297.

6.

Ibid. , p . 1 6 3 .
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Allan G. Bogue's study of farm mortgages, Money at Interest, helps
illustrate the relatively stable circumstances of Illinois agriculture compared
.

to western agrarian conditions.

7

Money at Interest examines the activities of

Ira Davenport and Sons, land speculators and money lenders active in Kansas,
Nebraska, Iowa, the Dakota Territory, and Illinois.

In Illinois, . the Davenports

made loans over a longer period of time, for greater amounts, and with a
smaller percentage of foreclosures than they did in any other place they
conducted business--Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, and the Dakota Territory.
i n Nebraska did they make a slightly greater number of loans.

But those

loans were for significantly smaller amounts, and had a higher percentage
of foreclosures, than did Illinois loans.

TABLE 1
LOANS MADE BY IRA DAVENPORT AN'D SONS

State

Years in

bm;iness

Number

of loans

31

1379

Kansas

25

571

Nebraska

30

1610

13

878

3

140

Illinois

Iowa
Dakota Terr.

Source:

7.

Allan

Average amount
of loan

Percent

Foreclosed

1 . 45

$1870

6. 70

600
700

3 . 00

31 4

23. 60

631

7 . 40

G. Bogue, Money at Interest: the Farm Mortgage

on the Middle Border, pp. l3, 29, 6 1 .

See footnote 5 in Chapter II for the complete citation.

Only
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Table 1 shows the Davenports definitely had more confidence in Illinois
agriculture than they did in western agrarian development--and with good
reason, for in Illinois their returns were steadiest and greatest.

Yet the

table above does not tell the entire story.
The Davenports started lending money in Illinois, Iowa and Kansas in the
same year, 1868.

In Nebraska they started three years later.

But their

success in these four states varied greatly. In Nebraska they made a large
number of loans each year from 1 8 7 1 to 1899.

But the hard times in that

state during the drought are obvious since 23 of 48 foreclosures i n Nebraska
came between 1881 and 1891.

The worst single year was 188�, when 13

landholdings were forfeited. 8 . In Kansas, there were no foreclosures during
the drought, but this was because very few loans were made in that state after
1883.

In fact, only 21 of Davenports' 571 Kansas loans were made between 1883
A combination of foresight, luck, and loss of confidence in their

and 1903.

ability to make money in Kansas was responsible for their good fortune in
averting setbacks there.

9

Dakota investments brought financial disaster to the Davenports.

During

the three years they loaned money in the Dakota Territory, they financed 140
mortgages.

However, in 1880 they were forced to foreclose on 27 of those

loans and did no business in the Dakota Territory after that date.

10

The

Davenports' experience in Dakota was partly responsible for bringing their
8.
9.
10.

Bogue, Money at Interest, p . 61.
Ibid. , p. 47, 57, 58.
Ibid. , p. 29.
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business in Iowa to an end.

The company made 878 loans in Iowa between

1 8 6 8 and 1880, with a high but not intolerable foreclosure rate of 7. 4 percent.
But this high rate coupled with the Dakota disaster, their involvement in a
usury suit, and doubts about the honesty and capability of their Iowa agent,
caused the Davenports to cease operations in that state after 1880.
In Illinois the picture w a s entirely different.

11

Illinois investment was

by far the most stable for the Davenports--only 20 foreclosures on 1379 loans.
Furthermore, conditions in Illinois during the late Eighties were so good that
they made no foreclosures whatsoever, although they negotiated 1 8 6 loans
between 1884 and 1891, 63 during the peak drought years in the West.
no sweeping conclusions can

be

12

While

accurately drawn from the investments of

only one company, there i s no reason to believe that the Davenports' operation
was not representative of most such companies during that period.

If the

Davenports were typical land speculators and investors, then their dealings
indicate that agrarian conditions i n Illinois were much more sound and stable
than those on the Middle Border.
Another factor differentiating Illinois agriculture from its western
counterpart was the state's relatively high rate of tenancy.

Between 1880

and 1900, about one of three Illinois farmers was either a sharecropper or
a cash tenant.

Although the rate of farm tenancy in Illinois was consistantly

higher than in the five western states, it showed much more stability.

11.

Bogue, Money at Interest, pp. 31-43.

12.

Ibid. , p. 13

Kansas,
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Iowa, and South Dakota, in particular, experienced a marked increase in
farm tenancy throughout all or part of those twenty years while tenancy
conditions in Illinois changed but very little.

This discrepency was probably

due to differing conditions in the two regions.

In the West where good land

was originally plentiful and cheap, low tenancy rates could be expected.

Most

settlers could afford to own their farms, particularly when sources for loans
were plentiful.

Illinois was settled much earlier, howe\•er, and by 1880 not

much good cheap land was available.

Poor farmers in Illinois, not able to

purchase good land there, were forced into the role of renters.

Furthermore,

as hard times struck agriculture, compounded in the West by the drought, many
over-extended farmers lost their holdings.

If they continued to occupy the

land, they did so as tenants of their original creditor or of a person who

TABLE 2
COMPARATIVE FARM TENANCY RATES
FOR SIX STATES: 1880 - 1900

Percentage o f Tenants
State

1880

1890

1900

31. 4

34. 0

39 . 3

Kansas

16.3

28. 2

35. 2

Nebraska

18. 0

24. 7

26. 9

Iowa

23. 8

28. 1

34. 9

.

7. 0

8.5

.

13. 2

21. 8

Illinois

North Dakota

South Dakota

Source:

.

.

Fred A. Shannon, The Farmer1s Last
Frontier: .Agricultur e, 1 860 - 1 8 9 ·7 ,

p. 418.
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purchased the property after the grantor foreclosed.
shown by the increasing tenancy rates in Table 2 .

This trend is clearly

I n Illinois the agrarian

economic situation was more secure, as the Davenport data and Table 2 indicate.
The low number of foreclosures in Illinois was reflected in a relatively stable
tenancy rate just as the high number of foreclosures in the West, as times
grew tough, resulted in increasing farm tenancy, changing farmers who were
over-extended from the ranks of owners to the ranks of renters.
In addition to the relative stability of Illinois tenancy rate, i t should also
be noted that, compared to the western states, Illinois farm tenants showed a
greater tendency toward sharecropping instead of cash rental.
itself is significant.

13

This .fact in

Under the typical sharecropping agreement, the landlord

allowed the tenant to occupy and work the tract in return for a percentage of
the crop when it was harvested.

Furthermore , it was not unusual for the

landlord to advance money or credit for farm implements, and even for seed
and fertilizer, to the tenant.

Such an arrangement was an ideal one for the

tenant farmer during hard times.

Unlike the cash tenant or the mortgagee,

who both had fixed expenditures for land, the sharecropper's expenses varied
somewhat with his success as a farmer.

·

After poor harvests, while he would

not have much to show for his work, neither would his debt be overwhelming
since he paid his landlord only a fixed percentage of his crop.

Thus, the

financial obligations of the sharecropper were always proportional to his
earnings.

The cash tenant and the landowner, on the ot her hand, were required

1 . Shannon, Farmers' Last Frontier, p. 418. A good discussion of
3
tenant farming and sharecropping, though slanted toward southern agriculture,
is found in Shannon's book, pp. 88-95.
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to make a specific money payment to their creditors, no matter how good or
how bad their harvests had been.

In good years, the cash tenant and landowning ·

farmer could fare much better than the sharecropper whose own profit never
exceeded a set percentage of his c.rop.

But in retrospect, given the condition

of agriculture after the Civil War, sharecropping seems to have been the best
opportunity for a farmer.
advantageous.

Also in retrospect, tenant farming in general was

When hard times struck, the tenant had far less to lose by

deserting the tract he was working than did the farmer who was mortgaged to
the land and had money invested in it.

Farm tenancy thus ameliorated the

hardships agricultural depression brought down upon the farmer, and the
circumstances of farm tenancy in Illinois can be viewed as further evidence
of the relatively satisfactory condition of the state's agrarian economy .

Hence,

it is difficult to understand why so many organizations spurred by agrarian
discontent, and dedicated to agrarian reform, got their start in Illinois .

Yet

all major organizations dedicated to agrarian reform, whether native to Illinois
.
or not, were exceptionally .strong in that state.
The National Grange, although originating in Minnesota, had an especially
active organization in Illinois.

Not only did the Illinois Grange obtain some

unprecendented state railroad legislation in the 1870's, but some Grangers
helped establish an autonomous parallel political organization, the Independent
Reform Party, which achieved tremendous local successes in 1873.

The party's

candidates appeared on the ballot in 66 of the state's 102 counties, and carried
53 of them.

The R�publicans and Democrats were thoroughly defeated, carrying
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only 16 and 20 counties respectively, while other independent tickets captured
13.

The 1873 successes were repeated in the state election of 1874.

Independent

Reform candidates captured three of the state's nineteen congressional seats
and destroyed Republican control in the state legislature by electing three state
senators and twenty-seven representatives.

However, the bright future of this

party dimmed in the late Seventies when it was absorbed into the Greenback
Party.

14

Two other, later agrarian organizations active in politics were the
Farmers' Mutual Benefit Association (FMBA) and the National Farmers' Alliance.
Both of these organizations were born in Illinois.

Milton George, a wealthy

Cook County farmer, founded the National Farmers' Alliance, primarily as
an offshoot of his successful agrarian newspaper, the Western Rural.

However,

George was not interested in the future of his paper, already widely-read, s o
much as h e worried about the future of American agriculture.

He used his

newspaper to communicate this concern to his readers and gradually developed
a philosophy which became the cornerstone of Populist thought .

In 1879,

George's attention focused on the farmers' problems with the railroads and on
the need for g:>vernment regulation.

After discussing this issue at length i n

the Western Rural, George suggested that his readers write to Washington and
to their state legislatures requesting such regulation as upheld by the Supreme
Court in Munn vs, Illinois.
14.

He promoted this suggestion by mailing out thousands

Buck, Granger Movement, pp. 88, 89, 94, 95.
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o f petiti ons to his subscribers, to known Grangers, and to farmers' clubs
throughout the Middle West.

When response was slow, George sensed that

some organized effort was needed and, again through the Western Rural,
urged the formulation of farm clubs to promote agrarian interests.

Sensitive

to the reasons behind the decline of the Grange, George suggested membership
not be secret, that the clubs be politic ally active and openly partisan, and that
dues be low enough to be within the means of all farmers.

He . even went so far

as to print a model constitution in his paper--a document which was ultimately
adopted and used by the Alliance throughout its existance. 15
'
Farmers' reaction to George's idea was not spontaneous, and they called
on him to provide them with

an example.

Consequently he agreed to establish a

local organization i n Cook County and called a meeting for tha.t purpose i n
April, 1880.

When only one farmer appeared for the meeting, George recruited

two staff workers from the newspaper.

Each of the four individuals became an

officer, and the Cook County Alliance was born in the office of the ·western
.
Rural, where the entire movement was ' to be headquartered for the next seven
years.

16

Until there were enough local alliances to justify the creation of the national
body, the Cook County group issued charters to farmers who were willing to
.

.

organize themselves under George's published constitution .

The first group

so inclined lived near Filly, Nebraska, and by August, 1880, local alliances
15.

Scott, Agrarian Movement in Illinois, pp. 22-26.

16.

Ibid. , pp. 27-28.

.
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were scattered throughout Kansas, Nebraska, Iowa, Wisconsin, and
At this point George called a national convention.

Illinois.

On October 14, 1880, 623 delegates from thirteen states met in Chicago
to consider action against the railroads.

When this meeting adjourned, about

hall remained to form the National Farmers' Alliance.

Although state organ

izations were at first difficult to establish, the number of local alliances
grew rapidly.

From 200 locals in November, 1880, the number grew to over

500 two months later and to 940 by the following October, despite vicious
attacks by farm papers competing with the Western Rural--attacks which
continued until control of the national organization was wrested from George
in 1 887.

17

Unlike the National Farmers' Alliance, the Farmers' Mutual Benefit
Association was not the work of one man.

In 1883, a group o f Johnson

County farmers discovered their local grain dealer uncooperative at harvest
When he declined to purchase their crop, they contacted the m arket i n

time.

St. Louis, hired their own railroad c a r , and disposed o f it directly.

To their

great surprise they found that elimination of the middleman increased their
profit.

Word of this success quickly spread throughout the county and their

neighbors began to join i n the selling effort.

Out of this union emerged a

secret organization named the Farmers' Mutual Benefit Association.
The FMBA grew slowly, partly from design.

Its leaders hoped to

avoid the rapid expansion and loose central organization which they felt had
17.

Scott, Agrarian Movement in Illinois, pp. 28-31.

43
weakened George 's National Farmers' Alliance.

Nevertheless, by 1887 the

FMBA counted over two thousand members in small local clubs scattered
throughout southern Illinois.

Fred G . Blood of Jefferson County was appointed

to lead a central organization empowered to establish locals anywhere in the
United . States.

18

However, Blood soon fell out of favor with the membership

and was replaced by Jdm P. Stelle of Hamilton County.
Under Stelle's able direction, the FMBA continued to grow.

Deterior-

ating agrarian conditions prompted its rapid expansion into neighboring states.
In October, 1887, the organization had389 local lodges.
rose to 942.

A year later the number

By November, 1890, Stelle reported a total of 2, 181 lodges and

by the following November counted almost 90 percent of this figure lived i n
Illinois or Indiana.

19

Within Illinois the growth of the FMBA was equally spectacular.
the group's strength was limited to six counties.

In 1886

By the end of the frillowing year

it occupied most of southern Illinois, absorbing independent agrarian organizations in Marion, Clinton, and Washington counties.

By 1889, the FMBA was

successfully competing with the National Farmers' Alli ance in central Illinois
and established strong locals in Clark, Cumberland, and Shelby counties.
year later it moved into the western section of the state, mainly along the
lower Illinois River, in Madison, Jersey, and Macoupin counties.
18.
19.

Scott, Agrarian Movement in Illinoi s , pp. 4 5 , 46.
Ibid. , pp. 49, 50.

20.

Ibid.
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However, the FMBA never was very successful in the counties between
the Illinois and Mississ ippi rivers.
the work of Blood.

Its failure in the area was due mainly to

After his removal as head of the FMBA, Blood became

associated with the Souther;1 Alliance and successfully organized the inter
river counties for that group.

The Southern Alliance, or National Farmers'

Alliance and Industrial Union, was organized by Charles W. Macune of the
Texas state Alliance after it broke with George in 1887 over the willingness of
the National Farmers' Alliance to admit Negro members.

A year later the

Southern Alliance merged with the Arkansas Agricultural Wheel, while the
FMBA rejected a similar offer of consolidation.

After the rejection, Southern

Alliance organizers, including Blood , appeared in Illinois and Indiana and
undermined FMBA strength in both states.
established a state alliance.

By 1890, southern leaders had

After the state organization was perfected in 1 8 9 1 ,

the Southern Alliance enjoyed considerable success in Illinois' western counties,
dominating the area between the Illinois and Mississippi rivers south of Rock
Island, as well as a band of counties on the east bank of the Illinois River.

By

the end of 1891, the organization was established in twenty-six counties, and
claimed a membership o f over twelve thousand.

21

In northern Illinois the dominant agrarian organization was the Grange
which, due to the hard times of the late 1880's, began a recovery from its
drastic decline in the latter Seventies.
21.

A fifth association, also showing strength

Scott, Agrarian Movement in Illinois, pp. 50-56.
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in the northern part of the state, was the Patrons of Industry.

However

the backbone of agrarian reform in Illinois was the alliance movement.

By

December, 1890, it included over 2 , 000 local clubs with approximately
62, 000 members, an average of one member to every four farms in the
state.

With almost half-again as many locals as the Grange had at its height

in 1875, organized farmers were a power to be reckoned with in Illinois.
22.

22

Scott, Agrarian Movement in Illinois, p. 61, and Buck, Granger

Movement, p . 64.

Membership totals in the various farm organizations i n

1 8 9 0 are a s follows: The National Farmers' Alliance had 1 5 0 locals and 7000
members, the FMBA claimed 1650 lodges and 43, 175, members; the Southern
Alliance had 160 locals and 3400 members; and the Grange, with 196 local
bodies, recorded 7500 members.

CHAPTER IV
The Peoplers Party in Iliinois

The Populists did not do well in Illinois in the election of 1892, despite
the state's proclivity to farm organizations.

The party's national ticket polled

a mere 2. 54 percent of the vote in Illinois, ranking the state thirty-first in
Populist strength in 1892.

In only twelve states did the ticket do worse, and

i n the Mid-West, only Ohio gave Weaver less support than he got i n Illinois.
On the state level, the Populist gubanatorial candidate polled four thousand votes
less than the Prohibition candidate, and none of the Populist nominees for
Congress or the state legislature were elected.

In fact, independent strength

in Illinois was less than in the mid-term elections of 1890.

I n the forty-third

senatorial district a Populist congressional candidate won 1 1 , 940 votes in
1890; two years later third party strength declined to 6, 916.
in other districts did even worse.

Populist nominees

In the forty-second district, once a center

1
of FMBA strength, the People's candidate polled a pitiful 297 votes.
The failure of the Populist Party in Illinois may be attributed to several
events and trends of the late 1880's and early 1890's.

Foremost among these

reasons, and central to most of the others, was the great variety of farm
organizations in the state.

The same factors which made Illinois the nucleus

of the agrarian reform movement also served to undermine the strength of the
Hicks, Populist Revolt, p. 263 and Scott, Agrarian Movement i n
Illinois, pp. 133-34.
1.
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only political party dedicated to meeting farmers' needs.

The major farm

organiz ations were fiercely independent and they jealously protected their
autonomy.

In a state completely divided among them by the mid-Eighties,

expansion of one group came at the expense of another.

A major cause for

concern developed by the end of the decade as the Southern Alliance began to
make inroads into the strength of the National Farmers' Alliance and the FMBA.
Not only did this challenge weaken these two organizations, but the close ties
between the Southern Alliance and third party politics brought to Illinois a com
mitment to action which many farmers were not willing to accept.
The idea of independent political action by Illinois farmers· originated in
1886, when the National Farmers' Alliance organized a lobby i n the state
legislature.

Two years later, the Grange followed suit.

But going one step

further, the Grange developed a list of state legislators opposing needed farm
measures and urged that these individuals be defeated.

Both the FMBA and the

Northern Alliance closely questioned each candidate about his stand on farm
issues and rejected those who took unsatisfactory positions.

The FMBJ\

bluntly warned the old parties about the possibility of independent political a.ction
if the farmers were not placated.
But earlier third party movements had met with little success in Illinois .
Name changes of the leading third party throughout the 1870's and 1880's
illustrated a swing away from serving farmers' needs.

Changes from National

Greenback to Greenback Labor to Anti -Monopoly showed the increasing
committment of third party leadership to the labor movement rather than to
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agrarian reform.

The convention which formed the Anti-Monopoly Party in

Chicago in 1883 ignored the Farmers' Alliance completely.

But formation of

another new party in 1887 quickly restored the farmers' voice in politics.
Although the name National Union Labor Party gave the appearance of labor control,
former Greenbackers and other rural elements dominated from the outset. While
its entire slate was spectacularly unsuccessful in 1888, the spectre of agrarian
political action motivated both major parties to be more receptive to farmers'
demands.

2

In such areas as Champaign County, where the Republicans were
supreme, the Democrats hoped for aid from the Alliance, and
i n southern Illinois both parties attempted to placate discontented
groups by naming candidates who were identified as being fav
orable to agriculture.

In the ni neteenth district, the RepubUcans

selected an FMBA member as their nominee, while in the
twentieth district the Democrats endorsed the c andidate of the
Union Labor party . . . . But when the votes were counted, it was
found that not only had no independent been elected but the candi
dates endorsed by an old party i.n an effort to upset a favorite had
similarly failed.

When victories on the local level also failed to

materialize, the Union Labor party ceased to exist as a political
entity.

3

The failure of the third party movement in Illinois during the Eighties may
be attributed partly to the relatively good condition of I llinois agriculture,
compared to states where radical parties had more success.

Added to the

reluctance of farmers to ('.!Ooperate with labor representatives, and to the inability
of fiercely competitive rival agrarian groups to unite, this factor doomed the
2�

Scott, Agrarian Movement i n Illinois , pp. 84-87.

3.

Ibid. , p. 87.
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future of any independent political action in Illinois.

4

The crushing blow to

third party politics. in the state was delivered by the election of 1890 and its
aftermath.
in that year.

Rural voters sent three independent legislators to the general assembly
These three held the balance of power between the major parties

in a protracted struggle over the election of a U . S . Senator.

The two candidates

for this office were Alson J. Streeter, noted agrarian liberal and presidential
candidate of the Union Labor Party in 1888, and John M . Palmer, long-time
attorney for the Illinois Central Railroad.

When two of these independent

legislators deserted Streeter and, under very suspicious circumstances, threw
their support to the railroad man, the third party movement in Illinois was
completely discredited.

This disaster, coupled with the loss of state Populist

leader Herman E. Taubeneck who went to Washington, D. C.

as the party's

national chairman, and the dismissal of the radical editor of the Farmers' Voice,
publ ished by Montgomery Ward and Company, deprived agrarian radicals of
badly needed leadership and sealed the fate of the People's· Party i� Illinois.

5

Though the Populists could not claim real success anywhere in Illinois
in 1892, they did relatively well in twelve counties, polling between ten and
seventeen percent of the votes cast in each county.

6

These areas of Populist

strength were well dispersed throughout the state: Stark County is located in
4 . Charles McArthur nestler, . "Consumation of a Labor-Populist
Alliance in Illinois, 1894 , " Mississippi Valley Historical Review, :XXVII

(March 1941), pp. 593-94.
5.

Ibid.

6.

Shelby County, i n east central Illinois was the most radical county,

with 1 7 . 2 percent of the vote there going to the third party.

Shelby's closest

rival was Fayette County, where 15. 4 percent of the electorate cast radical votes.
Surprisingly, Marion County was the exception in the group supporting the
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FIGURE 1
MAP O F ILLlNOIS SHOWING
COUNTIES BEING STUDIED
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north-central Illinois; Pike County i s situated between the Illinois and
Mississippi Rivers; Clark County is o n the Wabash River at the eastern border;
west of Clark is a large band of counties reaching south from the state's center-Shelby , Fayette, Jefferson, Marion, Clay, and Wayne counties; at the southern
tip of Illinois is another group of three counties--Johnson, Pope, and Hardin.

7

However, examination of several economic and demographic characteristics
which most of these counties shared in the Eighties and Ninties shows nothing
unique to them alone, nothing which was not common to any other counties
giving the Populists no significant support i n 1892.
Population trends and characteristics do not by themselves expl ain the
incidence of Populism in the twelve counties providing third party support .
Like Illinois at large, the population i n most of these counties was increasing
between 1880 and 1890-- albeit several of them, like Marion, Clay, Pope and
Shelby, were growing at substantially slower paces than the state's 26. 6 percent
growth rate.

Indeed, three of the counties in question--Clark, Clay and Fayette--

showed no growth at all over the decade, and Pike and Stark counties actually
lost people during the Eighties.

However, 31 of Illinoi s ' 90 non-Populist

Populist; only 9. 1 percent of Marion's votes went to the People's Party.
the figure was a healthier 13 . 6 percent.

In Pike,

For 1892 vote totals in all 102 Illinois

counties see the Appendix at the conclusion of this paper.
7.

Throughout the reminder of the text, counties and townships where the

People's Party did well--as defined by criteria outlined in Chapter 1, p.

7-

often will be referred to as "Populist counties" or "Populist townships , " and
the others identified as "non-Populist" areas.
sake only;

These labels are for syntax'

They are not meant necessarily to imply ahsol ute comparative

relationships in the voting strengths of the three parties.
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counties also showed wither a population loss or no growth during that decade;
so that factor alone obviously was not an important one in bringing out the radical .
vote.

In fact, the rapid jump in the state's population in between 1880 and 1890

mainly was due to tremendous growth in only
moderate increases during that period.

13 counties, while

46 showed just

8

One demographic characteristic which does help to distinguish the twelve
Populist counties from those with more conservative voting patterns, is the
ethnic factor.

The number of foreign-born in Illinois in 1890 was almost 850

thousand, up over fifty percent from the 1880 figure.

But in all twelve Populist

counties the trend was reversed, and the foreign population became smaller as
time passed.

Although the number of foreign-born also was falling in

53 other

counties, the twelve with radical political leanings are still unique because they
illustrated highly nativistic qualities.
in 1890.

The whole state was

21. 5 percent foreign

But, with the exception of Stark, no county where the People's Party

ran well contained more than a

of the twelve had foreign populations under three percent, and
twelve under two percent.

In fact, seven

5. 5 percent foreign population.
a

third of the

Although 16 other counties also fell into this range,

over half of the Populist counties ranked in the bottom third of the 38 least
foreign counties in the state.

9

All these highly native counties, Populist and

non-Populist, .also were highly agricultural; .
8_

U . S. Ce.nsus Of{ice, Census Reports, Twelfth Census of the United

States, Taken in the Year 1900, Vol. I, Population, Part I, pp. 16, 17.
U . S. Census Office, Compendium of the Eleventh Census: 1890,
Part I -- Population, pp. 482, 483.

9.
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Obviously the number of farms a county contained, and their average
size, gives some indication of its agrarian economic strength.

In a county

having no large cities to provide an industrial or commercial base--and all
twelve counties fit this mold--such a figure assumes paramount importance.
Farms in Illinois averaged 127 acres in 1890.

Farms in ten counties showing

some Populist strength in 1892 were considerably smaller, ranging between
90 and 113 acres.

Only Pike and Stark, the two northernmost counties did not

fit this pattern, averaging 135 and 154 acres respectively.

However, farms

in 22 other counties not supporting the Populists also averaged between 90 and
113 acres, or were smaller. lO

Thus while all but two of the twelve ranked

i n the lower third of the state's 102 counties according to farm size, other
factors must be considered to expl ain the presence of third party strength.
The same is true of farm values in the Populist and non-Populist counties.
With per capita values of $164 to $403, farms in the twelve counties showing
Populist sympathies ranked in the lowest quarter of the state.
i n sixteen other counties also fell in this value range.

11

However, farms

Nine of the twelve discon-

tented counties--Pike, Stark, and Marion excepted--had per acre values ranging
between $10. 68 and $20. 46.

12

In this case, only five non-Populist counties had

per acre values equally low; however> all five came from the sixteen conservative
10.

U . S . Census Office, Report on the Statistics of Agriculture in the

United States at the Eleventh Census: 1890, pp. 134-37.
11.

Again, Pike and Stark counties are the exception.

Their average farm

values were considerably higher.
12.

The per acre values for Marion, Pike, and Stark counties were

$23. 4 7 , $32. 39, and $52. 0 5 , respectively.
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counties sharing low per capita farm values with the Populist counties.
Furthermore, all five also were among the 22 non-Populist counties suffering
from smaller than average farm size.

13

These three characteristics--farm size, per capita farm value, and
value per acre--provide some general idea about economic conditions i n these
Illinois counties in the 1880's.

The size of a farm imposes limitations on how

much can be produced and, to a lesser extent, on what can be produced profitably.

Such factors in turn determine the income which can be derived from a

farm each year, and hence the living standard possible for the farmer and his
family.

"Per capita farm value" considers not only the general quality,

improvement, and size of farms in a county , but also the number of people those
farms must support . . This consideration is an important one, for the size of a
county's population can mitigate the economic strain of small or poor or unproductive farms, if that population is small, or make the problem more
severe, if the population i s large.

The average value of an acre reflects both

the degree of land improvement in a county and the productivity of its working
acreage.
Low values for any or all of these three characteristics indicate poor
conditions and economic problems in a county.

Thus, based on farm size,

per capita farm value, and per acre land values, the twelve counties showing
Populist strength _ in 1892 were poor agricultural areas.
13.

They ranked in the lowest

Statistics of Agriculture: 1890, pp. 134-37 a�d U. S.

_C

ensus Office,

Report on Wealth , Debt, and Taxation at the Eleventh Census: 1890, Part II:
Valuation and Taxation, pp. 24-26.
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quarter of Illinois counties in each of the measurements.

But eight of the 22

other counties sharing the problem of small farm size also shared either the
problem of low per capita farm values or low per acre values, and five of the
eight had all three problems in common with the more radical areas.

Thus,

while these three characteristics alone do not explain the degree to which
twelve Illinois counties leaned toward third party politics, the increasing
weight of a combination of adverse conditinns obviously was a factor in their
voting behavior.

Of 32 counties containing abnormally small farms, only ten

provided significant support for the People' s Party in 1892.

Of 18 counties

with small farms and either low farm values or below average values per acre,
ten had Populist sympathies.

Finally, of 14 counties suffering from problems

in all three areas, nine--a full 84 percent--showed Populist strength .
Illinois in the late nineteenth century was corn country.

14

Like the rest

of the state, the twelve counties giving support to the People's Party all planted
well over half their improved acreage in corn.

While i n general land in the

Populist counties was not as productive as the state average of 36. 8 bushels
per acre, no great production gap existed except for Clay, Fayette and Marion
counties, which averaged 24. 9, 23 . 1 , ancl 26. 4 bushels per acre, respectively.
One Populist county even had a production rate well above the state average;
Stark County farms produced 42 . 7 bushels of corn per acre.

The same

situation exists for wheat and oats, Illinois' other major cereal crops.

Although

the Populist counties showed less inclination to plant wheat than di d most other

14.

Statistics of Agriculture: 1 890, pp. 134-37 and U . S. Census Office,
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counties in Illinois, and although their wheat and oat production was not as
good as in many other areas, several non-Populist counties exhibited the
same characteristics.

15

If other counties were comprised of equally small, poor, unproductive
farms--if other counties had the same general demographic make-up--how
can the existance of Populism in these twelve counties be explained? A
possible answer might be the one already suggested--that no one or two
demographic or economic conditions by themselves motivated a large Popul ist
vote in 1892.

The twelve Populist counties consistantly ranked at or near

the bottom in several critical measurements; a combination of unfavorable
circumstances--each shared with some non-Populist counties, but with
substantially different ones each time--marked these twelve as uniquely
unfortunate areas.

A few non-Populist counties exhibited the same combination

of characteristics as the Populist ones.

However, each time another unfavorable

circumstance was added to those already affecting the group of depressed
Illinois counties, more non-Populist counties were eliminated from the list
of those areas suffering .. from that totality of conditions.

But in the end, at

least five non-Populist counties remained, in the same general economic
circumstances as the counties showing significant support for the third party
in 1892.
Report on Wealth , Debt , and Taxation at the Eleventh Census: 1890, Part II:
Valuation and Taxation, pp. 24-26, and Official Vote of the State of Illinois
in 1892, pp. 1 . 2 .
.

15.

Statistics of Agriculture: 1890, pp. 362, 363.
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A better explanation for Populist strength might be that no extreme
county-wide discrepancy i n conditions or circumstances existed as a reason
for third party voting.

A county is so large a civil unit that it might mask

great internal variations.

Within two counties appearing to be demographically

and economically similar, an area or areas might be substanti ally different
from others in the s ame county, or from areas in the second county.

Thus

internal differences might explain why the People's Party did well in one
county i n 1892, but not in another county with seemingly identical characteristics.
Perhaps Marion and Pike counties, the subjects of the next two chapters,
are the best examples of how examination of only county-level characteristics
can hide internal conditions.

If the 1892 election results were not available

for Pike County, one would hardly expect to group it with the other counties
showing Populist strength. Pike was the exception to the rule for almost every
condition the Populist counties had i n common.

Its farms were larger than

the state average.

Its land was as productive as its per acre and per capita

values were high.

By all these measures, 13. 6 percent of Pike County males

should not have cast third party votes in 1892.

However, closer examination

of conditions in Pike shows that not all townships within the county were uniformly
blessed by prosperity.
the county.

Nor was the Populist vote evenly distributed through'out

Support for the People's Party came from six townships; residents

of the other eighteen did not vote the Populist ticket to nearly the same degree.
Thus, the general conditions in Pike County are deceiving.

An enclave of
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hard-core radicalism existed in the southeastern townships, and study must
descend to the township level to uncover it.

16

Marion County was the exact opposite of Pike.

While Pike farms were

larger than the state average, Marion farms were smaller.
was productive, Marion County land was not.

While Pike land

Indeed, while Pike County

generally was the exception to the conditions the Populist counties seemingly
had in common, Marion typified them.

Poor, unproductive and highly native,

Marion fit well with Fayette, Clark, Clay, Jefferson, and all the other counties
where the Populists did relatively well in 1892.

But strangely, the People's

Party there showed less vitality than it did in untypical Pike County.

The

Populists in Marion polled less than the ten percent minimum established to
catagorize an area

a s a "Populist" county.

17

Yet it had to be included in

this study because it was one of only three counties in Illinois where the
Populists actually carried townships.

Thus, i n this case also, differences in

internal conditions seem to distinguish one county from another appearing
in the same general circumstances.

Otherwise, how does one explain the

existance of Populist townships in Marion County but not i n Edwards County,
for example , where the People's Party won just 2 . 4 percent of the vote ?
.
Point for point, Edwards County equals Marion County i n the general conditions
identified as common to the Populist counties--farm size, per capita farm
values, land values per acre, ethnicity of population, and others .
16.

Why did

Statistics. of Agriculture: 1890, pp. 134, 135, 205, and 363; ·wealth ,

Debt, and Taxation: 1890, p. 25; and Pike County Democrat, November 16, 1892.

17.

Statistics of Agriculture: 1890, pp.

134, 135, 205, and 363; Wealth ,
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some counties give over ten percent of their votes to the People's Party i n
1892 while other counties exhibiting similar circumstances did not?
did

some

Why

to\vnships i.n Marion County go i nto the third party column tn 1892,

while those in nine of the other Populist counties did not ?

Why did some areas

in Marion County vote for the Populilsts while other townships i n the same
county give them no support? If an attempt is to be made to answer these
questions, a township-level study is needed.
The folbwing two chapters provide a grassroots study of two of the
three counties where the Populists c arried townships in 1892.

18

Both

chapters examine conditions i n the most politically partisan townships where
9
each party achieved its greatest percentage of the votes. 1
and clarity sake they are identified here:

For simplicity

In Marion County the Populists carried

only one township, Raccoon, and ran ahead of a major party in another, Meacham.
Haines Township as also studied as an area of Populist strength because the
radicals fell only three votes short of equalipg the Republican total.
is the most Republican township, and Tonti the most Democratic .

C arrigan

In Pike

County the Populist townships are Pearl, Hardin, and Montezuma; but strong
Populist undercurrents existed in Newburg and Spring Creek.

Detroit is the

Democratic township and Martinsburg the Republican one .
Debt, and Taxation: 1890, p. 2 5 ; and Marion County Democrat, November 18, 1892.

1 8. As noted in Chapter 1, a study of the third county, Shelby, is not
possible because the necessary tax records have been destroyed.
19.
pp. 6, 7.

The process for selecting the subject townships is detailed i n Chapter 1 ,

CHAPTER V
Agrarian Discontent in M arion County, Illinois

Marion County is a flat area in the heart of southern Illinois.

Twenty-

four miles square, the county is composed of sixteen townships, each containing
23, 040 acres .

Marion was originally the nothern part of Jefferson. County,

but in 1823 it was granted autonomy and named after the Revolutionary War
hero, Francis Marion.

1

The first settler in what became Marion County arrived with his son from
Shawneetown, Illinors i n 1813.

They were joined a year later by a settler from

Tennessee, and subsequently by others from Tennessee, Kentucky, and Virgini a .
Despite this promising beginning, only 1040 of the county's 3 6 8 , 640 acres were
in private ha nds by 1824, although some squatters existed on the public domain.
In 1825, a special census showed just 527 persons living i n Marion County; but
the economic direction of the area already was established.

·

�

1 1 6 were farmers and o e was a blacksmith.
obtaining autonomy.

The county grew quickly after

By the 1830 census the population quadrupled to 2125.

doubled to 4 , 742 during the next ten years.
to 4 , 720 to 12, 739.

2

Of 1 1 7 adult males,

It

Between 1850 and 1860 it doubled

3

1.

See map on p . 5 0 to locate Marion County.

2.

J. H. G, Brinkerhoff, Brinkerhoff's 'His tory of Marion County, Illinois

(Indianapolis: B . F. Bowen and Co. , 190�) • . pp. 40 , 41.
3.

Twelfth Census, Population, Part I, p. 1 6 .
60
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A significant event in the county 's growth occurred in
was granted to the Illinois Central Railroad.

The railroad's arrival precipitated

a scramble for landholdings i n Marion County.
made, only

When the railroad grants were

105, 000 acres, less than one-third of the county's total, were

privately owned.
vanished.

1852, when land

However, by

1865 all public land in Marion County had

Thus, while the population of the county was doubling, the amount of

private la ndholding increased threefold.

4

Marion County gave little support to the nation's war efforts in the
mid-nineteenth century.
the Blackhawk War in

Only

1832.

41 men responded to a call for troops to ftght

This lack of public support probably was because

the people of Marion County were not intimidated by a military threat so far to
the north.

During the Civil War the county sent 1516 men to fight, although

unlike the larger and more populous Pike County, they raised no local regiment.
Also, it is noteworthy that less than ten percent of Civil War veterans from
Marion County were volunteers.

5

After the war Marion County veterans returned to farming, although not
on what could be called a spectacular scale.

In fact, agricultural statistics for

the county help expl ain the agrarian unrest there during the Eighties and Nineties.
I n 1890, only 37 of Illinois

102 counties had more farms than did Marion County.

Yet 63 of them possessed a greater number of improved acres.

4. Brinkerhoff, History of Marion County , pp. 54, 55.
5. Ibid. ' p. 51. .

Furthermore,
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although local farmers spent $3, 672 on fertilizer in that year, the fourth
highest amount in the state, the county ranked eighteenth from the bottom in
farm production.

6

The major crop in Marion County was corn,
in 1890 .

the

premier crop in Illinois

Yet fertilization notwithstanding, the county' s corn production was

dismally low.

The 50, 070 acres of Marion County planted in corn in 1890,

produced an average of 26. 4 bushels per acre.

Not only was this figure well

under the state average of 38. 1 bushels, but only five counties experienced
poorer corn production; in fact, eight Illinois counties planted fewer acres of
corn but had a higher total yield than did Marion.
Illinois' second important crop.
acre.

The same is true of oats,

State production averaged 36. 5 bushels per

But with a rate of 24. 8 bushel� per acre, Marion County was also one

of the poorest oat-producing areas

in.

the state . . Since corn and oats were the

two major crops in Marion County too, economic conditions there were highly
unsa,tisfactory.

7

Certainly many Marion County farmers must have felt the same way about
the condition of agriculture as did the county's most famous product, William
Jennings Bryan. Born in Salem in 1860, Bryan remained in Marion County
until 1874, when he moved north to Jacksonville, Illinois.

Furthermore, by

living in Jacksonville until 1887, Bryan was well able to keep in touch with
relatives in Marion County and as conditions deteriorated there, and around
Jacksonville, Brya � ' s political philosophy likely was established.
6. ·Statlstics of Agriculture: 1890, pp. 204-06.
7. Ibid. , pp. 362, 363.
8. Brinkerhoff, History of Marion County, pp.

2 1 5 , 216.

8

G3
In 1890 and 1 8 9 1 , western Marion County was plagued by a series o f
barn burnings ultimately traced t o a Sandoval farmer named McKibbon.

The

press characterized this individual as a bright but misguided man influenced
by radical literature.

Brooding over the unequal distribution of wealth in the

county, he finally acted to bring equality.

McKibbon gathered together a group

of young men holding similar views and over several months spread havoc and
terror throughout the county.

He was eventually betrayed by one of his followers
Brought to trial, McKibbon

and captured in the process o f blowing up a store.
was convicted and fined five hundred dollars.

He remained in . jail until his fine

.

was paid by relatives, whereupon he was released and left the county for good.

9

'

Although McKibbon stood trial and was punished for only his criminal
acts, the social ideas he espoused also were unpopular in Marion County, at
least among its more prosperous citizens.

In Salem, the local press of both

major parties seemed to sense the potential grassroots strength of a radical
political movement in the area.

At first they ignored the third party, but as

Populist support grew in the outlying townships, bot the Republican and Democratic
newspapers abandoned this tactic and lashed out at the radicals.

The Republicans

confined their attack to Populist vice-presidential candidate James Field, reporting
he regretted not having killed more Union solders during the Civil War.

lO

Perhaps

fearing they had more to lose, the Democrats' attack on the radicals was vigorous and continual.
2.

10.

The party's press reported that Populists were of two types ,

Brinkerhoff, History of Marion County, p.
Marion County Republican, September '8 ,

187.
1892.
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"broken-down, dissappointed, discouraged, old men . . .

(and] young men,

who are below the average of intellegence and of no standing in their commu.nities , "

Faithful Democrats were warned that Populist sentiments were generally

not praiseworthy and that the entire movement bordered on being revolutionary .

11

The course of the general election i n Marion County was established by
the township contests held in April, 1 8 9 2 .
Democratic candidates were successful.

In the majority o f the townships,
But in Carrigan Tavship, where both

an independent slate and a 11peopler s11 ticket also were on the ballot, the
independent candidates were elected.

The only other local contest involving a

Populi st effort was in Raccoon Township where the FMBA backed a victorious
third party slate.

12

As local radicals began to formulate a county slate for -

the general election, Marion Democrats increasi ngly became concerned a split
in their ranks would ultimately help the Republicans and they commenced
active campaign in the press against this threat.

an

The party organ in the county

admonished potenti al deserters by stating:
It seems to us very much out of place for certain Democrats ( ?)
to assert that they will not vote for certain individuals should
they succeed in obtaining the Democratic nominations . . . after

the majority of Democrats after the nomination have been made, ·

[wn!J heartily support the ticket.

We know no other Democracy.

13

Fearing the Populist movement would hurt their entire candidate slate,
Democrats struck hard at the dangers of defecting from the ticket:
11.

Marion County Democrat, July 8, 1 8 9 2 .

12.

Ibid. , April 9 , 1 8 9 2 , and Marion County Republican, March 10, 1892.

13.

Marion County Democrat, April 1 8 , 1892.
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Our Republ i c a n friends, of this County, are hoping that there

will be sufficient dissensions among the Democrats, enough .

bolters to enable them to defeat a portion of the Democratic
ticket.

Their hopes are i n vain, for, with but few exceptions,

e_ruocrats

individual D

united frorit.

of this County will present a solid and

However, these fears proved unjustified . and grandiose rhetoric was
unnecessary.

Although the Populists fielded a county ticket i n June, they had

no central committee nor any county-wide organization.
convention attracted only abo ut forty persons. .

Their county

Furthermore, the results of

the general election, held November 8, 1892, were not altered by the presence
of a third party on the ballot.

The entire Democratic county slate was elected,

although the Populists carried Raccoon Township and made significant inroads
in Haines Township.

In Meacham Township the Populists finished second to

the Democrats but ahead of the Republican candidates.

In Carrigan Township

the Populists ran poorly but lured away enough Democratic votes t o deliver the
township: t o the Republicans.

15

Table

3 shows the vote distribution fol.' the

townships being studied in the presidential election of 1892.

Since straight-

ticket voting was common during that period, the totals for state and county
candidates of each party varied only slightly, if at all, from the votes cast
for the presidential contenders.
Figure 2 illustrates that the third party vote in Marion County did not
come from any enclave of hard-core discontented, agrarian radicals.

Instead,

the areas showing significant Populist strength were well-dispersed throughout
14.
15.

Marion County Democrat, May 6, 1892.

Ibid. , November 18, 1892.
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Raccoon and Haines townships are located in the south-central

portion of Marion County, and Meacham is in the extreme northeast corner.
Not surprisingly, the radical activities of McKibbon in 1890 and 1891 likely
.

�

.

'

contributed to the poor Populist showing the the western townships.
Voting patterns in the five Marion County townships generally seem to
verify the hypothesis advanced earlier that tenant farmers might be less
susceptible to radical agrarian movements than landowners because they had
fewer roots and were less likely to stand and fight against unfavorable conditions.

16

According t o the theory, during depression the proportion of landowners in areas
showing tendencies toward radical politics might be higher than in more politically
stable ones, where high tenancy rates would be expected.

16.

See Chapter ID , pp. 38, 39.

Although the relationship
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FIGURE 2
MAP OF MARION COUNTY, ILLir-;OIS SIIO\:Y1NG
TOWNSHIPS BEING STUDI ED

M�AC.HAt{
-

C A R R\C,,\,N

�

To Nil

So.l<!M
G3

RACC. o o N

HAINES

�
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.Source:

Plnt Book of l\Iarion County Illinois

.
bet\veen land ownership and politic al unrest is not a perfect one, Table 4 shows
a strong gener al association between these two variables. · In the three strong
Populist townships--Meacham, Raccoon, and Haines--the lanholding rates
were relatively high, since almost half the residents owned the land they .
farmed.

Furthermore, i n stable Carrigan Township , where the People's Party

polled only seventeen of the

166 votes cast in the general election, the

ownership rate was a very low 34. 1 percent, while 65. 9 percent of the family
heads were tenants.
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Ti\BLE 1
PERCENT.AGE OF LANDOW�lN'G RESIDENTS COMPAHED TO
THE PERCENT AGE OF
·

TOWNSHIPS

OF

LAI\'"D THEY OWNED IN SELECTED
ILUNOIS, IN is92

l\lARION, COUNTY,

-·

-

'

Lancl Owned by Residents

Residents Owning Land

Township

i
34. 1

40 . 2

Haines

42 . 2

54. 7

Mench am

46. 8

44. 2

Raccoon

46. 1

51. 2

Tonti

42. 8

42. 5

C arrigan

Source:

Assessor's Books for Carrigan, Haines, Meacham, and
Tonti townships for 1892, and Raccoon Township for 1891.

However, while general tenancy trends in Marion County support the
theory of correlatio n between landholding and radical agrarian politics, in Tonti
Township, where the Populi�ts fared most poorly in 1892, the percentage of
·
landowning residents was about the same as i n Haines; where the p arty came
within three votes of equalling the Republicans.

Thus, although ranking the

townships by amount of resident land ownership and by degree of Populist
strength produces fairly positive relationships, the association between landownership and political behavior is not strong enough to equate radical politics
to that factor alone.

Obviously, additional forces also motivated farmers in

some townships to cast large numbers of votes for Populist candidates, while
i n others the residents were not similarly affected.
Another factor weakening the potential value of any strong positive
association between Populism and landowning is the probability that not all

69
persons . seeming t o b e without real property actually were tenant farmers.
From available information, the total number of tenants in a township must
be determined by subtracting the people owning both land and personal property ,
as recorded in the county tax books , from its entire list of personal property
holders.

However, i f this remainder was all tenant farmers, the . tenancy rates

for the townships studied would vary between 53. 1 and 65. 9 percent, figures
.

unbelievably high when compared to t h e county average o f 25 percent.

17

Most

likely, some persons who might otherwise be classed as tenant farmers in a
township actually owned and worked land in neighboring townships.

Such instances

would be particularly expected in cases where those residents lived near
township borders.

Other tenants may not have been farmers at all, but instead

farm laborers or persons engaged in agriculturally-related occupations.

Thus,

determining the number of tenant farmers in a township is a high speculative
operation, but one which affects calculation of the percentage of resident landowners--from which the theory equating landownership and radical politics
is drawn.
While a direct link cannot be drawn between real estate and support for
the Peoples' party in the varirus townships, the figures in Table 4 and their
attendent interpretation problems do not affect the actual distribution of
property within each township.
not a perfect association.

Again

a general tendency exists, but certainly

The table shows that in two of the Populist townships,

Hai.nes and Raccoon, landowning residents possessed more than their arithmetic
17.

Statistics of Agriculture: 1 890, pp. 134, 135.
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equal share of the acreage and crowded the tenants, a majority of the elect
orate in each case, onto a disproportionately small amount of land.

However,

i n C arrigan Township, where Populist candidates ran poorly, the identical
situation existed because only 34 percent of the citizens owned 40 percent of
the land.

In the Populist stronghold of Meacham most of the property \Vas

held by absentee owners.

Thus, McKibbon 's activities notwithstanding, the

hypothesis that inequality in the distribution of property might have bred
·
discontent at the polls meets the same fate as the theory t.hat equates radical
politics and landowning; the relationship is not strong enough to stand alone
as an explanation for Populist electoral fortunes.
Other v�riables in man-land relationships in the townships studied are
detailed in Table

5.

The table indicates that no good relationship exists

between resident farm size or improved acreage and Populist strength i n the
five townships.

Resident landowners in Carrigan and Tonti, where the

People's Party did most poorly i n 1892, had the largest and the second-smallest
farms, respectively, the largest and smallest number of improved acres,
and the greatest and smallest percentage of improved land.

However, Table

5

does illustrate a strong and clear-cut relationship between Populism and agrarian
conditions in Marion County.

A direct association exists between Populist

strength and land values on the township level.

Even though the farms of Tonti

landowners were the second-smallest of the· townships studied, their values were
the second-highest.

Furthermore, although the average Tonti resident's farm

was the least improved, the per acre value for all his land, improved and
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unimproved, was the highest of · ·an five townships.

Carrigan farm3 did

have a higher percentage of improved acreage than farms i n the Populist
townships.

But this advantage does not completely account for the higher
. .

land values in Carrigan.

.

For example, although Carrigan farms were seven

percent more improved than those i n Meacham Township, land on Carrigan farms
was worth eleven percent per acre more than Meacham land.

Thus only two-

thirds of their difference i n value can be attributed to the higher percentage
of improved acreage on Carrigan farms; the other four percent difference was
due to the higher quality of improved land in Carrigan Township. ·

These facts

mean that even though landowning farmers i n the three Populist Townships
generally worked a greater number and percentage of improved acres, their
farms were worth less than farms i n the two townships where the People's
Party did poorly i n the 1892 elections.
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The relationship between land worth and Populism i s further illustrated
by Table 6, which details the value of land held by nonresident landowners and
worked by tenants.

At first

glance, the figures listed below might give the
TABLE 6

PERCENTAGE OF LAND IN SELECTED TOWNSfilPS OF MARION
COUNTY OWNED BY NON-RESIDENTS, PERCENTAGE O F THEIR

l

LAND WHICH WAS IMPROVED, AND ITS VALUE I N 1892.

-·----

t

l

Land

I111p1·oved

TownshlJJ

Value

Per Acre

_
Currigan

Hai.nes

Meacham

Raccoon
Tonti

Source:

11 8 . 8

5 7 . !j

68. 2

$5 . 02

62. 6

4 . 03

71. 2

G. 07

61. 2

3 . 87

63. 7

4 . 88

Ass0ssor ' s Dooks for

Carrignn, Ifoincs, Meachnm,
and Tonti townshi.ps in 1892, and for Raccoon
Township in 1 8 9 1 .

impression that Meacham Township, an area of Populist strength, does not fit
the general pattern established by Table 5 for equating land values and radical
politics.

However, as in Carrigan Township in the previous table, the high per

acre value of Meacham's nonresident real estate i s due more to a disproportionate
amount of improved land than to its quality.

If the same correction factor just

used for Carrigan Township in the previous table is applied to Meacham land
values, the worth of nonresident landholdings there drops from $5. 07 to $4. 42
per acre, well below land values i n townships where the Populists. showed no
strength.

Thus Meacham Township also fits the relationship establ ished

between the value of both resident and nonresident, or tenant, landholdings

73
and radical agrarian politics.

A ranking of all acreage by worth in the townships

being studied shows the nonradical Carrigan and Tonti townships �t the top of
the list with equally high land values of $5. 2 8 per acre.

Well below those

two townships, the three acres of Populist strength--Haines, Meacham, and
Raccoon townsh ips--had average per acre values of $4. 0 7 , $5. 07 and . $4 . 2 8
respectively.
Tables 5 and 6 , and the expl anatory material accompanying them,
establish on township level the same general relationship between Populist
strength and low agricultural production cited earlier in this chapter for all
Marion County.

18

The only plausible explanation why land i n townships having

a high percentage of improved acres would be worth less than real estate in
nearby townships with a lower percentage of working acreage is· that the improved
land i n the former townships was poor, and hence probably less productive,
than land in the latter ones.

Not only did the Populists show strength in Marion

County, one of the poorest producing areas in the state of Illinois, but within
the county the strong Populist townships also very likely were areas of low
production, a factor which drove down their land values.

On the other hand,

the townships with higher average land values, and with sometimes fewer but
more fertile ·acres i n production, gave almost no support to the People's P arty
i n the

1892

election.

Thus a strong connection may be established between low

production and poor land, and radical agrarian politics, at le�st i n Marion
County.

18.

No matter whether ..thei:z:: .f.arms were larger or smaller than farms of
See pp. 6 1 , 62.
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other townships, no matter whether a greater or lesser proportion of their
farms were actively in production, in the townships showing Populist strength,
farmers worked poorer and less productive lands than did their more prosperous
and fortunate neighbors.

This inequity in production well could have made

farmers in the three disadvantaged townships extra-sensitive to agrarian conditions-a sensitivity manifested a t

the polls in November, 1892, by lnrge numbers of

votes for a radical agrarian party.
The lmv agricultural productivity in Haines, Meacham, and Raccoon townships, all areas where the Populists did well i n the general election, was due to
rudimentary farming techniques.

Indeed, the relative degree of mechanization

in the five townships was analogous to the fertilizer situation in the entire
county.

Just as Marion County was among the most heavily fertilized but

poorly productive areas in the state, within the county the poorly productive
Populist townships tended to be more highly mechanized than those townships
where the third party did not do well.

Table 7 detail$ this trend by showing a

markedly higher degree of farm mechanization in the townships providing
support for the Populists i n the election of 1892.

19

In Carrigan and Tonti townships, where the Populists had no electoral
success, the average value of machinery on each farm was significantly less
19.

The terms "machinery" and "mechaniz ation" are used advisedly in

this context.

They refer to a wide variety of implements and devices.

Some

of the more sophisticated and modern machines developed in the Seventies and
Eighties and commonly in use in 1892 include: drills and broadcast seeders to
mechanize planting, cultivators and fertilizing machines, and harvesting devices
such as reapers, binders, threshers, and rakes.

A concise yet excellent

discussion of agricultural mechanization during the late nineteenth century i s
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than i n those townships giving support to.,the third party movement.

Furthermore,

almost one·-fourth to one-half of the farmers i n the non-Populist townships
reported no machinery at all on their farms.

Among the more radical townships,

only Raccoon, where a sixth of the farms had no machinery, even approaches
this level of unmechanized agriculture.
It must be noted at this point that Table 7 only concerns machinery
possessed by resident landowning farmers.

No accurate method exists for

determining how many of the townships' tenants actually farmed--although
it probably was a high percentage.

But if the hypothesis that a strong positive

relationship exists between farm ownership and radical agrarian politics is
found in Shannon, Farmers' Last Frontier, pp. 125-46.
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a correct one, then measurement of mechanization oh tenants' farms is of less
importance anyv1ay.

Indeed, analysis of mechanization using all adult males

--tenants and landowners both--in the five townships as the subject population,
produces nearly the s ame results as Table 7 .

Although the differences between

the townships' mechanization levels are less marked, only Carrigan Township,
where two-thirds of the residents were tenants--the highest tenancy rate in the
five townships--fails to fit the pattern of high mechanization and radical politics
established in Table 7.

This relationship is elaborated by Table 8, which takes

int.o account the average size of each township's landholdings in determining
its relative degree of mechanization.

Introduction of the farm size variable

makes even greater the difference between mechanization in the politically
moderate townships and in the radical ones.
TABLE 8
VALUE OF AGRICULTURAL MACHINEHY AND IMPLEMENTS PER
IMPROVED ACRE OF LA:t\1D OWNED Al\TD FARMED BY RESIDENTS

I N SELECTED TOWNSHIPS OF MARIO;N COUNTY, ILIJNOIS ·" . I N 1892.

Township

Carrigan
Haines
Meacham
Raccoon
Tonti

SoL1rce:

Average
Fa.rm Size

132. 5

Improved
Acreage

115. 5

110. 3
80. 2

104. 5
88. 0
95. 1

79. 7
63. 9
63. 7

Average Value of
Farm Implements

$3. 09
4 . 44
8. 68
4. 48
2 . 80

Value Per
Improved Acre

$0 . 028
. 0 55

. 109
. 070
047

•

Assessor's Boo!(S for Carrigan, Haines, Meacham and Tonti
townships for 1892, and Raccoon Township for 1 8 9 1 .

rr11
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Not only· was land in the three Populist townships considerably inferior
to working acreage in Carrigan and Tonti township� , where the Populists did
poorly in the 1892 election, but Tables 7 and 8 shows the discontented areas were
much more highly mechanized.

That their land did not produce well, despite

the use of costly implements, must have been an additional i rritant to the
discontented farmers of Haines, Meacham, and Raccoon townships.
Although strong relations-hips may be drawn between radical agrarian
politics, unfertile and poorly productive land, and high levels of mechanization,
no such association exists with the personal property wealth of the five townships,
as Table 9 illustrates.

Personal property includes all livestock, farm implements:.

TABLE 9
PERSONAL PROPE: t rfY HOLDI NGS IN S 8 T..EC'!".8D TOWNS!I!PS
O F MAHION COUNTY FOH l$92

rI

I Township

I

�

Total Val9e of

�

�

:Number of

I1

Personal Property · J\dult Males-

-

.<\ verag0 .V�lue of

Personal Property

Carrigan

$21 , 22 9

194

$109

48

j :\reacham

3 1 , 32,1

251

125

18

2 2 , 938

198

j Hnines

' H ac".:oon

jT011ti

I

Sm�rce:

24 , 7 1 8
2 5 , 8�4

'

284

225

115

i

)
. }faving no
Personal P roperty

10

G7

30

115

. 10

Assessor's Books for C:lrri.ga11, Haines, 1V1.;)achnm, nnd Tonti
townships for 1892, an<l for Raccoon Townsh�p for 1 8 9 1 , and
.
''Aggreg3te Population By l\'.Iinor Ct·::il Divisions , " Co�1pendi�
cf the 8lcventh Cen!.ius: 1 S 9 0 , P3rt I--Porml�1t£on, p. 122.

•
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money, stocks and credits, merchandise or grain investories, and household
furnishings ; it is the best available indicator of the general living standard
in an area.

The table shows that, with the notable exception of Raccoon,

all townships were about equal according to this mc�surement.

The case of

Raccoon Township i s unique because of the three Populist areas being studied,
it is the only one where Populi$t strength actually exceeded the popularity of
both major parties.

The general poverty of this township well may have been

the additional factor needed to push a poorly productive, yet highly mechanized
and highly discontented area into the People's Party column i n the election of 1892.
Populist historians, mainly studying the western phase of the movement,
claim the most fruitful areas for the radical agrarian movement were those
places hardest hit by declining agricultural conditions in the 1880's.

20

Table 10 shows that for Marion County, Illinois at least, this theory must be
A general decline indeed did occur in the five townships, in

modified.

several economic areas during the Eighties.

But in none of the oategoi'ies

detailed in the table were declines in Populist townships significantly more
marked than in the more politically moderate townships.

21

However, support

for the theory that areas suffering the greatest agricultural collapse were also
of strongest political radicalism can be found in the first column of the table.
20.
21.

·

Hicks, Populist Revolt, pp. 31-35, 254-64.
The percentages in this table were calcul ated by using the 1879 figures

as the basis, and by measuring the amount of growth or decline, over time,
from that point.
figure.

The change was then recorded as a percent of the 1879 base
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Although economic conditions were on the decline, Marion County
agriculture was in the midst of a period of expansion--most rapidly in the
three Populist towi ships.

Agricultural expansion usually was done on borrowed

money. · Thus expanding areas, especi ally where growth may not be pratical
or wise, were most sensitive to an economic contraction.

The financial

activities of the Davenports during this period--along with their foreclosures
as hard times struck--clearly illustrate this principle.

22

Since crop prices

were steadily falling, farmers had difficulty not only in making loan payments,
22.

See Chapter. ID, . pp. 35, 36.

7
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but even in recovering their production costs.

This situation required that they

often borrow money to meet the daily expenses of farming.

As conditions got

worse after 1887, sources of conventional loans dried up and farmers were
forced to resort to high interest chattel mortgages on farm implements and
home furnishings to acquire operating capital or to obtain

�oney for expansion. 23

This financial arrangement especially was likely in a heavily-settled aren such
as Marion County, where expansion seldom meant acquisition of new land, but
more often placing property already owned info production.

Unless the farmer

with a mind to expand acquired his new land from a neighbor's unimproved ac reage;
or unless he had paid off hi.s own farm to a point where a second mortgage was
possible, a chattel mortgage was the only answer, except for a loan against
his crop.

The tenant farmer, with only his crop or his personal property as

collateral, had even fewer alternatives.

But in ·

any case, if the land did not

produce well, or if agricultural prices fell sharply, or both, the heavily
indebted farmer suffered severely.

Such events well may explain the sharp

drops in personal property holdings shown by Table 10.
For the farmers of Haines, Meacham, and Raccoon townships the outlook
must have been especially discouraging.

Faced with the twin problems of

poor land and low prices for their crops, they tried to keep their heads above
water financially by placing more acreage into production and by investing i n
farm machinery to a greater extent than their neighbors.

More frequently

actual owners of the land they worked than were their compatriots in nearby
23.

Farmer, "Economic Background of Frontier Populism, " p. 419.
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townships, they were less able to pick up stakes and move on when hard
times hit.

Their expansion plans were borne of desperation.

were to the wall.
better.

Their backs

Circumstances had to be changed; conditions had to get

Otherwise, these farmers would fall continually deeper into debt.

Such farmers had a greater than normal interest i n altering the status quo-economically, socially, and politically--even to the point of supporting radical
propos als.
Thts , as in the West, radical agrarian discontent in Marion County
grew strongest in areas of marginal agricultural value, and where farmers
were caught in unsound expansion when agriculture collapsed in the midEighti es.

The Populists of Marion County lived i n townships where poor soil

meant low productivity, despite the farmers' attempts to change their situation.
These factors, coupled with the collapse of the rural economy while they were
i n the process of expanding to increase production--and with what must have
been mounting frustration about the distant and impersonal forces that undermined and negated their continuing efforts at self-help--proved catalytic, and
long-smouldering discontent about agrarian conditions changed into open and
concerted political protest in the election of 1892.

CHAPTER VI
Radical Politics i n Pike County, Illinois

The People's Party showed cons iderably more strength in Pike County
than it did in Marion.

The 13. 9 perc ent of the Pike vote captured by the Populists

was much better than their 9 . 1 percent success in the southern county.

In

addition, while the Populists made a s i gnificant showing in only three Marion
County townships, they did well in seven townships of Pike County.

However,

these were not the only differences between the two counties; they differed in
several other ways.

1

Containing s ixteen incorporated towns and thirty-one ·

villages, Pike County in 1892 was considerably larger and mor e developed
than its . southern counterpart.

Pikers twenty-four townships numbered half-

again as many · as in Marion, and the county's 756 square miles gave it a total
land area

31 percent larger.

2

Located on Illinois' western border about a hundred miles due north of
St. Louis, Pike is a r�ver county; more than a fifth of its total area is in the
fertile valley formed by the Mississippi River, which marks its western boundry.
Pike's other side is extremely poor, hilly, and bro ken country, culminating in
a high bluff running the length of its e astern border, the Illinois River. 3

The

geographic features of the county played a significant role in its development.
1.

Official Vote of the State of Illinois in 1892, pp. 1 , 2 .

2.

M. D. Massie, Past and Present o f Pike County, Illinois (Chicago:

S . J. Clarke Publishing Compnny, 1966), p.

3.

Ibid.
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The area was considerably less isolated than lVIarion County.

Its river

borders provided easy access for moving people and produce north to Chicago
or south to St. Louis.
some drawbacks.

However, the geography of the county also presented

The presence of good, fertile bottomland in its western

townships and of rugged, heavily-timbered countryside on its eastern border,
created a discrepancy in conditions which registered quite graphically in the
election of 1892.
Most of Pike County pioneers established residence in the more promising
western sections of the county.

But despite the fertile land that area had to

offer, permanent settlement in the county occurred relatively late.

The first

families arrived from Massachusetts in 1820 and settled in what became Atlas
Township, in the southwest· section of the present county.

As the southwest

quickly filled, later arrivals chose more central locations.

Thls shift in

settlement patterns was recognized in 1833 when the county seat moved from
Atlas to Pittsfield, the fastest growi.ng village in the area.
Pike County originally was tremendous i n size.

4

Established in 1821

·

as a Military Tract for veterans of the War of 1812, the county at first extended
eastward along the Kankakee River to the Indiana line, and so far north that
when the county's first election was held, the thirty-five votes cast included
"those of the French at Chicago. " But large portions of land were cut off
by the Illinois legislature in 1823 and again in 1825.

Eventually, fifty counties

M. D. ;Mass.ie, Past and Present of Pike County, Illinois, p. 51, and
History of Pike County, Illinois (Chicago: Charles C . Chapman and Company,
1880), pp. 265-69.
4.
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Bitter controversy

were organized from the land separated from Pike.

dominated Pike County in 1847, when the Illinois Constitution cal1ed for
township organization.

But an election held in 1849 approved an organization

plan, and in 1850 the county adopted the civil structure it has tod3.y.

5

Like its southern counterpart, Pike County was named after a noted
historical figure--thc famous explorer, Captain Z ebulon Pike.
in Pike was much more uncertain than in Marion County.

At first, life

Indian troubles

dominated the county's early history, but the military origins of Pike's citizens
gave them the means to establish peace and security.

In 1830, the county' s

citizens banded together in an unofficial militia to drive out fifty or sixty Sac
and Fox Indians who were squatting on the land and raiding local farmers'
Two years later a company was raised in Atlas �ownship to fight

livestock.

the Blackhawk War, a short distance to the north.

Prospective volunteers

were summoned to a ·grand meeting and were encouraged by martial music
and buckets of whiskey to take the fateful step fonvard.
had passed

By the time the buckets

.
6
round three times, a hundred men had enlisted.

The county 's contribution to the Civil War was much more significant;
over half the electorate enlisted in the Union c ause.

Not only did residents

of the county supply companies to various Union regiments, but i n 1862 nine
hundred Pike County men formed their own regiment, the 99th Infantry.

This

unit saw sixty-two days of action between 1863 and 1865; its most important
5.

History of Pike County, pp. 196, 2 4 6 , and Past and Present of Pike

6.

Past and Present of Pike County, pp. 34, 52-54.

County, PP.· 34, 44, 45, 5�, . 79, 80.
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engagement came at Vicksburg.

In addition, the Henderson Home Guard,

130 strong, was formed in 1861. probably a s a defense against any proslavery
activity from across the river iu

Missouri.

7

After the war citizens of Pike County returned to farming and to the
status quo.

Ideas for change promoted by the war were resisted by the

county during the post-war era.

Plans for bringing the railroad to Pike County,

begun in 1863, suffered a setback in l 867 when the voters narrowly defeated
a borid issue to finance construction.

It started again in 1869 when a group

of citizens raised $32, 000 and several townships assessed themselves $150, 000
to provide the necessary fnnds.

But not until 1872 did county officials finally

get approval from the voters to issue railroad bonds, thereby guaranteeing
Pike County an alternative to river transportation--the Wabash, St. Louis
and Pacific Railway Company , Incorporated.

8

The direction of Pike County politics might have been predicted by the
conditions of agriculture in the county.
was good.

In general, farming in the county

As in Marion County, corn was the major crop.

But unlike her

sister county, Pike had 72 percent more land in corn production, and the
yield was less than a half bushel below the state average of 38. 1 bushels per
acre.

While oats were Marion's secondary crop, in Pike County that position

was accorded wheat.

Here also the county's production average of 1 5 . 8

bushels per acre approximated the state average of 16. 3 bushe�s.
prqduction Pike bested Marion County.
7.

Even in oat

Although only a tertiary crop in Pike

Past and Present of Pike County, pp. 70-72, and Hisbry of Pike

County, pp. 373-82.
8. Past and Present of Pike County , pp. 107-09.
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County, oat yields averaged 28. 3 bushels per acre compared t o 24. 8 bushels
in Marion.

Overall, although Pike County was only 31 percent larger than

Marion County, Pike farmers had over twice as much land in cereal production.
In terms of total improved acreage, the discrepency was n:ot as great; Pike
Count�; contained only 67. 5 percent more improved acreage.

Thus, agriculture

was considerably more advanced in Pike County than in Marion, their size
differences notwithstanding.

9

However, it is very likely not all shared in the agricultural wealth of
the Pike County.

The county ' s eastern townships were reported to consist

of mostly broken land--very rough, and suitable only for livestock production-not the fertile, well-watered, well-cultivated prairie and bottom land described
in the central and western townships. lO The relationship between political
discontent and the topography of the seven townships selected for study is shown
by Table 11.

It is worth noting that all the politicnlly dissident townships, where

the Populists out-polled one or both major parties, are located together in the
southern quarter o f the county.

11

Figure 3 illustrates this grouping.

Yet the relative success of the People's Party i n Pike County i s surprising
i n two respects.

First, the attitude of the local press showed a general lack of

concern about the third party movement.

Evon the few editorial att acks launched

against the Populists conveyed supreme confidence.

9.
10.
11.

Commenting on the physical

Statist.ics of Agriculture: 1 8 90, pp. 205, 363.

History of Pike County, pp. 404-868, passim
The single exception was Ross Township in the extreme southwest

of the county.

Tax records were unavailable for this township, so it could

not be included in the study.
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1892

t.he b<lllot !.mt

qualities of a Populist publication he h:ad received, a contributor in the. county' s
major paper noted that "its faded appearance represented its party, which seems
to be fading away. . . . Poor little thing.
you ever begun for. "

12

If thou art so easily done for, why was

.
But more often the Populists merely were ignored and

.

.

were given little coverage of any kind.
Alliance was not a third party man.

Even the president of the local Farmers'

13

However, the newspapers ' neglect of the People's Party may have been

a

purposeful attempt to help maintain the social and political status quo, a course
of action which may distort the third p::irty's actual place in the history of Pike
County.

In any case, the radicals seem to have achieved a level of disorganization

matching Populist efforts in Marion County.

12.

13.

Pike Cou nty Democrat, January
Ibid.

Pike County P?pulists apparently

12, 1892.

FIGURE 3
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had no central committee or county organization.

The local press did cover

the organizational meeting of the People 's Party in St. Louis in February
1892, and at least two area men attended it.

14

But i f the county's radicals

organized the March 26 tovmship meetings and held the April 16 county
convention mandated by the St. Loui.s meeting,
.
never reported it.

� ike

County's two newspapers

In April's township elections the Populists fielded slates

in only three of the county's 24 towns hips.

All third party candidates were

soundly beaten-- i n Flint Township by a three to two margin, and in Perry and
Griggsville townships by nearly ten to one.

15

That disaster, plus two rallies

in the autumn of 1892 mark the extent of the Populist's political activity i n
Pike County--at least a s reported by the press.

16

On the other hand, both

papers reported indiscriminately the numerous activities of each major party
and seemed neutral in the election, especi ally when compared to the highly
vocal political organs i n Marion County.
Compared to other areas of Illinois, the People's Party was successful
in Pike County despite its lack of organization and activity.

The Populists

captured Hardin, Montezuma , and Pearl townships outright; in Pearl the
third party received more votes than the Republicans and Dem9crats, combined.
In Newburg and Spring Creek townships the Populists ran second to the
Republicans and to the Democrats, respectively.

Yet, adjacent to this block

14.

Independent Press, February 24 and March 2 , 1892.

15.

Tuid. , April 6 , 1892.

16.

Ibid. , September 1 4 and October 5, 1892.

90
of

radical

townships

support, the two major

by the largest

concerning

the

parties

carried Detroit and Martinsburg

nr nrgins in Pike County .

condition of

agriculture

in

all

After examining data

seven of these to\vnships, o n e

i s hard-pressed to explain the e}q1lain the existance of Populist strength i n
some locales

between

but not.in

townships

others.

However, some relationship� do exist

characteristics and third

party strength in Pike County.

The fact that those associations are more hidden and

County

underscores

the greater

Although in Marion
between landowning
were

all

subtle

than in

Marion

complexity of political behavior in Pike.

County a generally positive

and Populism,

17

in

Pike

relationship existed

County i t

seven Pike County townships filled with

did not.

tenants,

Not

only

but as Table 12

the Populist townships had the highest and the lowest incidence of

details,

resident landowners . . Interspersed among the Populist areas in the table
are

Martinsburg, with

and Detroit,
showing

having

a

second highest percentage of resident ln.ndholders,

which falls

exactly in the middle, with two radical townships

greater proportion of landowning farmers ,

less.

Neither

Martinsburg nor Detroit gave

and three

any

Populist ones

significant support

to the third party in 1892.
While fewer residents of Pike

land

County townships

they farmed, those who did own it controlled at

township ' s resources as
17.

M arion landowners

Chapter 5, pp. 66-68.

did.

actually owned the

least as much

of their

Carrigan Township, with
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TABLE 12
PERCENT AGE OF RESIDENTS 0Wl\1ING LAND AND
PERCENT AGE OF TOWNSHIP LAND THEY OWNED
IN PIKE COUNTY, ILLINOIS IN 18.92.

Township

R es i dents
owning land

Land owned

by Residents

Index of

Inequ ality

De troi t

26. 1

53. 3

26. 2

Hardin

19. 6

51. 7

32. 1

Marti nsburg

31. 8

57 . 3

25. 5

28. 7

59. 3

30 . 6

Newburg
Pe arl
Spring Creek

38. 2

53 . 8

25. 6

22. 3

50 . 1

27. 8

Montezum a

Source:

22. 6

51. g

29. 3

Ass e s s or ' s Books for Detroit, Hardin, Ma rt in sb urg, Newburg·,
Pearl, and Spring Creek townships for 1892, and for Montezuma

TO\vnship for 1891; and "Aggregate Popt1lation By Minor Civil
DiYisions, ' 1 C ompe n di um of the Eleventh . Census : 1890, Part I-
Popul ation , pp. 123-124.

the highest tenancy rate in Marion County, shows about the same perc ent of ·
resident landowners as does Newburg Township, the Pike County Township·
with the lowest tenancy rate. But the 38. 2 percent of Newburg's residents
who owned land, possessed 53. 8 percent of the township's real estate.

In

.
18
C arriga n 34. 1 percent of the people owned only 40. 2 percent of the land.

The difference between the percent of res idents owning property and the
percentage of the property th ey own is an i mpo rtant one.

19

It provides some

idea about the comparative degree of equality, or inequality, in the distribution
18.

19.

Se e Table 4, p. 68.
See pp. 69, 70.
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of property in the various townships.

Theoretically, if resources are

divided equally, thirty percent of the people occupy thirty percent of the land,
seventy percent of the people seventy percent of the land, and so on.

Land

distribution in Marion County was rel atively equal in all five townships, and it
does not seem a factor explaining radical political behavior there.

However in

.Pike County, not only was property di stribution greatly unequal in all seven
townships, bnt the degree of inequality varied among them in such a way that
it creates a strong though not perfect relationship with Populist strength.
As

Table 12 shows, not only was the incidence of landownership much

lower in Pike townships than in Marion, but in Pike it also fluctuated much more
from township to township--ranging from 19. 6 percent of the people in Hardin
controlling 51. 7 percent of the land, to 2 8 . 7 percent in Montezuma controlling

59. 3 percent of the land, to 31. 8 percent in Martinsburg controlling 57. 3
percent of the land.

Subtracting the percent of "residents owning land" from

. the percent of "land owned by residents" provides an index of !'inequality .' 1 1

By

itself this figure has no real meaning, but compared to the index of inequality
for other townships it provides a measurement of relative inequality fn land
distribution among each township's residents.
greater the inequality of distribution.

The larger the index figure the

For example, in Hardin, which has an

index figure of 32 . 1, land was less equally distributed among the residents
than in Marti nsburg Township, which had an index figure of 25. 5 .

Table 12

shows the four townships where inequality in distribution of resources was
greatest were strong Populist areas i n 1892.

Of the three townships where the
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i nequalit y was least, two--Martinshurg and Detroit--gave almost no support
to the third party in the election.
townships, where the

inequality

Furthermore, in Hardin and Montezuma
absolute

was most acute, the Populists won an

vote s.

majority of the

Unfortunately, no such strong relationship exists when comparing radical
politics to farm size, farm value, and degree of improvement, as i llustrated
by Table 1 3 .
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Populist townships i n Pike County contained both the largest
T .:\TIL"S 13

.

J\\T 8111\GE SIZI:, .c\ CTU:S I N PHODUCTIO:-f, 1\ND VALUE OF
F 1\ HMS

OWNED HY :nESIDE NTS OF s�;:LECTED
PIKE COUNTY, I LLn..;orn, I N 1 892

IN

-

r··

i.

Intprovecl

L.
I Detroit
I Hal'clin

I
;

l

J

L

lVI �1rti nsburg

-

1'1Iontezum3
Newburg
Penrl
Spring Creek

Source:

,1

I

1�13. OAcrcH
213. 0
135. 7

116. 9

115 . 2

98. 8

110. 6

90. 6

1 1 50. 5

·

59 . G

Assessor's Boo ks Io-r

I

20 .

7 . 92

12;30

6 . 62

1310

1 1 . 1t3

451

4 . 07

1366

1015

410

39. 4

53 . 9

•y
"'

6. t12

8. () !)

4 . 17

11.:Ir.rtinshurg, Newbur g,

1892, and l\Tontezu�nn

and the smallest farms, as in Hardin and Pearl, and the
nwnber .of improved acres on them.

-

77. 5

Detroit, Hardin,
Creek townships for

Pearl, and Spring
Tmn;.sh ip fm.· 1891.

-

$11�3

1
' 8. 3

I

J

Voluc

Per' 1\cro

63 . 3

66. 3

77. 3

90. 5

38. 9

Farm V�lue

70 . 7

1 0'! . 9

I

Pe rcent

I

•

•

Improved

Acres

Farm Size

Township

j.

TOWNS.HIPS

largest

and

l

I

smallest

Furthermore, with the exception of Pearl

The data i n this table must be interpreted with the same methodological .
qualifications as used for Table 5 for Marion County in Chapter 5 . These
qualifications are outlined in Chapter 5 on pp. 68, 69.
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and Spring Creek townships, no consistantly significant differences in degree
of improvement exists between farms in the politically radical areas and farms
in the more moderate ones.

The same lack of association is also shown by .

consider ing average farm values in the various townships.
i n two of the Populist townships

In this case, farms

ware worth the least and second least; but in

two other Populist townships they had the highest and second highest values of
the areas studied.

Centrally located in the measurement of farm values were

two non-Populist and one Populist tO\�nship--petroit, Martinsburg, and
Montezum a , respectively.
Average land values further reflect the lack of any relationship between
the agricultural conditions shown in Table 13 and radical voting behavior.
Real property in some Populist townships, like Newburg and Montezuma,
was of high value per acre.

In other radical areas, such as Pearl and Spring

·
Creek, the land was poor--probably i n both value and quality-- and land in
Hardin, the remaining Populist township, differed little in value from
Martinsburg, where the third party found no significant support i n 1892.
Table 14 specifies this lack of relationship by showing values by land classi
fication, thus remo}'ing the differences in degree of improvement as a factor
affecting the values in Table 13.

I t also considers all land in the various

townships, and therefore it is a more comprehensive measurement than Table
13, which only deals with land owned by the townships ' residents.
Note that once the differences in degree of improvement are removed,
the lack of relationship between land values and Populism becomes even more
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CO!vIPJ\Hi\TIVE Lf\l\1J VJ\ J.,UES IN SELCCTED TOWNSHIPS
O F PIKE COUNTY, ILLINOIS, IN

Lnncl

[;,�wnship

Improve_d

l

1892

Value Per Ae;rc

lmprovcd Land

Unimprvvccl L�nd

Hnrclin

Gl. G%
68. 5

Martinsburg

73. 5

Newburg

78.

Pearl

6
36. 5

Spring Creek

49. 4

Montezuma

Source:

G0 . 2

I

----·-

-

D etroit

All L�rnd

$12. 63
8. 12

$3 . 41

8. 52

2 . 77

2. 9 7

1 2 . t!4

12. 38
6 . 15

Assessors' Books for Detroit,

6. 3 7
7.00

1 . 90
3. 7 1

10.01

1. 41

3. 75

2 . 32

7. 87

s �}. 08
8. 2 G

4. :rn

Hardin, M8 rtin sbu rg, Newburg,

Pearl, and Spring Creek tmvnships in 1892, and Montezum�

Township for 1 8 9 1 .
apparent.

Since it has already been suggested the value of improved acreage

is a function of land quality, fertility, and productivity,

21

one can say that

while the working acreage in some Populist townships was poor, it was no
worse than farm in some non-Populist areas.

Furthermore, the same kind of

statement also is true for Pike County's good land.

The most valuable acreage

in the townships studied was found in two Populist and one non-Populist areas-Montezuma, Newburg, and Detroit townships, respectively.

Thus, unlike in

Marion County, no relationship between radical politics and land values, quality,
or productivity existed in Pike.
The only possible correlation between farm characteristics and Populist
e,l<;3ctor,nl. strength in J?ike County is found by employi�g a rather indirect and
2L

See Chapter 5, p. 73.

sophisticated statistical measurement method.

Farms in Pike County averaged

1 3 5 . 0 acres in 1892; of that amount 103. 0 acres was improved land.

Although,

as Table 13 already has established, no relationship exists between Populism
and farm size or number of acres producing crops, comparing each township's
deviation from the county norm uncovers the fact that Populist townships were
farther from the county average than were non-Populist ones.

Farms i·n

conservative political areas were close to the county norms for size and for
number of improved acres.

Farms in Populist townships were more distant

from county averages in these two measurements; they either were much larger
or much smaller than the arithmetic mean for Pike County farms.

This

discovery produces strong Spearman Coefficient of Correlation values of

O. 789

and 0. 859 when comparing the amount of Populism in each township to its
variation with mean farm size and number of improved acres on Pike County
farms; but the result is only a statistical curiosity.

22

The Spearman value

statistically "proves" the bigger or the smaller a radical township farm· was-or the greater or lesser amount of improved acres the farmer was working-the stronger Populist sentiment was i n that locale. An explanation may be found
to account for the lack of radical political behavior in the non-Populist townships;
conditions there were average for Pike County, and the residents therefore had
no reason to exhibit a high degree of discontent.

But what factors do townships

with farms much larger than average have in common with areas.where farms
are much smaller than normal, which would explain their tendency to support
See the Appendix for an explanation of the Spearman Coefficient of
Correlation as a statistical tool.
22.
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a third party ticket i n 1892 ?

No reasonable interpretive judgement can be

attached to this relationship.
However, as in Marion County, Populism i n Pike was closely associated
Table 15 shows

with the degree to which local agriculture had been mechanized.

DEGREE OF 1\GIUCULTUU i\T, J.:-,JECHA�,;; z x rroN A!:.-TO i'i"G

Ll.NDOW0T.T.NG 1;'1\Hl\Tl'.: ! � S Pi S.t�LECTED }'OWNSifLf>S O F
PIKE COUNTY, ( LOLINDIS, H:�D2

Towm.>hip

27

$ G.51

15

6. 50

•

fj 5

$ 381
358

Martinsburg

101

488

39

Montc::r,uma

104

7-10

'12

4 . 84
7 . 12

Newburg

108

1135

35

1 0 . 50

Pearl

75

38!!

28

5. 12

Spring Creek

99

701

25

7. 0 8

58

Detroit
Ifardin

Source:

Assessors' Books for Detroit, H:irdin, Martinshurg, Newburg,
Spring

C reek and Pc::n·l townships for 1892, 01:d Montcz u m n

Township fo r 1 8 9 1 .
this relationship.

The average value o f implements o n each farm i s obviously

·
not associated with radical politics since the townships with the highest and
lowest average values both were Populist areas.

But, this measurement is

affected by the number of farmers working landholdings using only rudimentary
farming techniques and by the great variation i n degree. of land improvement
among the seven townships, illustrated by Table 13.

Nevertheless ,. it is worth

noting that a generally higher percentage of farmers in non-Populist townships
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reported no farm machinery than did i n areas where the third party was
strong.

Table 1 6 takes into account this factor and also the variance in

percentage of improved acre age on farms in the townships studied.

It

standardizes the difference in degree of improvement by providing not an
absolute value for agricultural mechanization but instead a value per improved
acre.
TABLE l G
V1\ LUE OF AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY A:N'D IMPLEMENTS
PER IMPROVED ACRE OF LAl\'D IN SELECTED TOWNSHIPS
OF PIKE COUNTY, ILLINOIS, I N 1892

Value Per Improved Acre
Owned by Residents

Township

All Improved L<lnd

Detroit

$0 . 0 72

$0. 07 9

Hardin

. 043

. 04 2

Marti nsburg

. 046

Montezuma

. 092

. 1 09

Newburg

. 11 6

. 100

Pearl

. 132

. 13 9

Spring Creek

. 1 19

. 1 12

Source:
.... ... _
.

·.

043

Assessors' Books for Detroit, Hardin, Martinsburg,
NewbLirg, Pearl, and Spring Creek townships for
1 8 9 2 , and Montezuma Township for 1891.

A quick look at this table shows the average improved acre in the Populist
townships had more machinery available to work on i t than in the non-Populist
townships.

The only exception to this relationship was Hardin Township� which

the People's Party carried.

�

But e erywhere else it is apparent the Populist

townships were much more highly mechanized.

Although this characteristic
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cannot be also tied to land values, as it could in Marion County, Pike
Populists must have

bem frustrated too, because their investment i n farm

machinery had not paid off in more productivity than their unmechanized
neighbors enjoyed.
Table 17 established that, as in Marion County, no correlation existed
Although the

between personal property values and radical voting behavior.

J)1';1�SO.L'! :\I. J>�:OPEHTY Ji:J r_;DI.NGS .l"N s::.;: LJ;; (:T1�0 �l.'O\(l.M3I-1IPS
(.)}' :nKE C0Uf1'l'Y :!:'CH .l S 9'.�

144
1 9-i

G.2

�7

�--�--�

'

� Source:
...... � ..
,

f

llG

---�-----L__---�-· -��---_.,..

.Asse.:>sors' Books fo1· Detroit, H;•rd in, l\f;.n-ttnsburg:
anc.'1.

8 ?.
!>7

1-!'eY.rburg, T'0::: 1·l,

Spi: ing Crzi:::k to\·rns!1ips for 1892, <rnd j\[ontezmna for 1892; und

"Aggregate

PopulnU o n by

the E1eyenth

Minor Civil Divisions,

Cens u:3 , 1 8 !3 0 ,

Pnrt I--Populn ti.':'n ,

11

Compendium of

pp.

12;1 -124.

·

amount of personal property--including livestock, farm implements, stocks and
bonds, and furniture--varied more among the townships of Pike than it did i n
Marion, no definite pattern proves residents of Populist areas were consistantly
richer or· poorer than their non-Populist neighbors.

Nor was the incidence of

propertyless residents any greater or less in the Populist townships.

l

l

100

Comparing the data in Table 13 with the information provided by Table 16
gives a good picture of the conditions in Pike County prompting support of a
radical third party in 1892.

Close examination of both tables reveals a

significant point; the townships where farms had the fewest number of acres in
production were lhe most highly mechanized.
improved acres were the least mechanized.

Those with the largest number of
If all the townships are ranked in

order according to the increasing number of improved acres on their farms and
also by the decreasing value of their machinery, the results are identical.
Since its farms were the most highly mechanized and had the smallest amount
of improved land, Pearl Township ranks number one in both catagories, followed
i n order by Spring Creek, Montezuma , and Newburg--all Populist townships in
1892.

The politically moderate townships, Detroit and Martinsburg, rank fifth

and sixth on both the farm size and mechanization lists.

Only the third party

stronghold of Hardin, which was least mechanized and had the largest number of
improved acres per farm, broke the pattern by ranking last.

But with the exception

of Hardin Township, there exists a strong and explainable relationship between
Populism, land in production, and mechanization of agriculture.
As in Marion County, farmers i n the Populist townships· of P�ke were
making an effort to improve their agricultural situation by using machinery.

·

I n this way they attempted to compensate for the small size of their farms by
increasing their efficiency and, hopefully, their incomes.

Though their land

was no poorer or less productive than their politically moderate neighbors, the
Populist farmers of Pike's rugged eastern townships had less of it.

Furthermore,

�I
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their small amount of productive acreage largely was owned by the people who
farmed it.

With money tied up i n the hind .and also in machinery to work it,

residents of the Populist townships had a double incentive to stay on and fight
to improve their situation.

But the continued decline in agriculture, despite a

heavy financial investment in land and machinery, ultimately had the same effect
in Pike County township as it did in Marion County i n 1892; it brought out the
intensely frustrated farmers to vote for the People's Party.

CHAPTER VII
Demographic Trends in Marion and Pike Counties

Any attempt . to study political behavior ultimately must deal with
people--not necessarily as individuals, but people as the masses.

More

specifically, population trends sometimes help assess the general economic
condition of an area.

The degree of movement in or out of an area, like

a city or township, or even a state, provides some hints about the opportunities there, at least from the residents' point of view.

The most notable

manifestation of this phenomenon is the almost complete depopulation of
areas in Kansas and Nabraska after the collapse of agriculture in the mid
Eighties.

1

The tremendous flood of immigrants to the United States starting

i n the 1840's provides an example of people drawn to an area because they
perceived it offered great opportunity.
But any l arge� rapid movement of people to or from a place is both
socially and economically unsettling to its residents.

The social aspect of

rapid population change might include such manifestations as weakened
institutions--churches, fraternal and occupational associations, and local political
groups--due to constant fluctuations of membership caused by people entering
or leaving the area.

Friendship patterns and social structure would be disrupted.

.The economic consequences would be reflected most in property values and i n
1 . Farmer,. "Economic Background of Frontier Populism , " pp. 420-22, and
Shannon, Farmers' Last Frontier, pp. 307, 308.
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the labor market.

'I'he Latter consequence would not be especially pronounced

in family farming areas like Marion and Pike counties, but large numbers
of persons moving in or out of these counties, or o·f particular townships,
certainly would affect the real estate· market for farmland; to a great extent,
the law of supply and demand would determine the price per acr_e asked, and
the price realized.

Also, rapid population movements put a strain on public

institutions, due to overcrowding on the one hand or to loss of tax support on
the other.

Examples might be schools, township or county roads, and public

charity for paupers--both Marion and Pike counties had poor farms for
indigent persons, and each township had a poor fund for outdoor relief.
It is not unlikely that such social and economic upheavals would have political
manifestations on election day.
Thus a population study can be of value to an analysis of voting behavior,
if only to prove the null hypothesis--that no relationship exists between the
demographic characteristics of a political unit and its voting patterns.
seems to be the case in both Marion and Pike counties.

Such

No significant asso

ciations between population trends or characteristics and political behavior
can be established.

At first glance, a signific·ant difference in popu� ation trends

seems to exist in the two counties, as shown in Table 18.

While the population

of Marion County showed an overall growth rate of 28. 3 percent between 1870
and 1890, the population of Pike County remained fairly constant.
some conceptual dangers are hidden in these general figures.

However,

The increase

in Marion County was neither steady nor widespread. In fact, · the greatest
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TABLE 1 8
POPULATION GROWTH O F SELECTED TOWNSHIPS I N
MARION COUNTY AND PIKE COUNTY, ILUNOIS,
1870-1900

Civil Unit

Marion County
Carrigan Township
Haines Township
Meacham Township
Raccoon Township
Tonti Township

Pike County

1870

1880

1890

1900

2 0 , 622

23, 686

24, 341

3 0 , 446

x

875

77 4

1 , 129

891

927

1 , 003

1 , 427

835

1 , 073

1 , 139

1 , 181

790
1 , 137

1 , 215

900

954

918

30, 768

33, 751

3 1 , 000

3 1 , 595

1 , 056
1 , 468

1 , 008
1 , 410

833

84 7

1 , 4 66

1 , 353

1 , 498

1 , 47 8

1 , 540

1 , 243

628

845

1 , 009

1 , 365

x

x

-

Detroit Township
Hardin Township
Martinsburg Township
Montezuma Township
Newburg Township
Pearl Township
Spring Creek Township

Source:

1 , ()51

896

1 , 186

1 , 157

1 , 360

1 , 420

1, 060

1 , 127

1 , 256

1 , 518

1 , 590

1 , 557

"�opulation of Civil Divisions Less than Counties , "
Ninth Census, Vol. 1 , The Statistics of Population
of the United States, pp. 1 1 6 , 1 1 8 and " Aggregate
Population by Minor Civil Division, " Compendium
of the Eleventh Census, 1890 Part I - - Population,
pp. 122, 124, 125; "Population of States and
Territories by Minor Civil Divisions: 1890 and
1900 , " Census Reports, Vol. 1 , Twelfth Census of
the United States, Taken in the Ye�r 1900, Part !-
Population, pp. 1 2 6 , 128.
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surge in the county's growth came in the years after the election of 1892;
before 1890, the growth of . Marion County was only slightly more rapid
than the population increase in Pike .

Furthermore, the very small rise

in Pike County population in general conceals great variation and fluctuation
at the township level.
In both Marion and Pike counties, most of the to\U1Ships studied suffered
some population loss during the 1880' s.

Exceptions to this trend were Tonti

·
Township in Marion County, and Spring Creek and Pearl townships in Pike
County, all of which showed varying degrees of growth during the decade.
Two of the Marion townships experiencing marked population losses, Haines
and Meacham, exhibited strong Populist undercurrents in 1892.

However,

Carrigan Township also suffered a large loss but gave almost no support to
the Populist ticket; and Raccoon Township, the only one of the People's Party
carried in the election experienced the smallest loss of all. In Pike County
comparisons of voting trends to demographic trends are equally inconclusive.
Populist townships in Pike showed the only gains and the biggest loss in
population.

But other Populist townships had gains or losses not significantly

different from townships where the radical party had no strength at all.

Table 19

specifies these relationships by outlining j population trends in the several
townships in Marion and Pike counties during the two decades prior to the
election of 1892.
The reason for this mass exodus during the Eighties is

a

matter for

some speculation, and is of more than a little concern to this study of agrarian
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Ti\BLE 1 �>
POPUL/\TION CHANGE I N SELECTED TOWNSHIPS I N
PlKE COUNTY Al'\1) MARION COUNTY, 1870-1900

1 870 - 80

F

+15%

Cnrrig�n

x

Hnines

x

-11

Meacham

+11

-17

R accoon

+ 4

-

-12

x

Tonti

+10%
- 5

Detroit

t.� .. .

-

-

- 17

4

Martinsburg

8

-12

-19

+ 1%

8%

-

Newburg

•

5

x

Hardin

1

-

0

- 25

-

x

4

-

Montezuma

x

+ 6
-.·

Pike County

�

+ 3%

Marion County

1 8 70·-90

-

-

26

-28
-

8

-

19
9

. -31

-1 5

Pearl

+35

+49

+100

Spring Creek

+35

+17

+ 58 ·

J,,.'"':.

Source:

"Population of Civil Divisions Less than Countie s , "

Nint4 Census, Vol. 1 , The Statistics of Pooulation

of the United States, pp. llG,

118 and "Aggregate

Population by Minor Civil Division,

of the Eleventh Census, 1890 Part I
pp.

,

11

Compendium

--

Population ,

122, 124, 1 2 5 .

•

. .

, ..

conditions and radical politics. · While n o good way exists .to ascertain whether

.

.

outmigrants merely moved from one township to another, or whether they left
the county, or even the state of Illinois, i t is not unrealistic to claim that such
drastic population movements indicate to some degree the discontent within the
effected townships.

Happy , contented, and prosperous people obviously are

less likely to pull up stakes and leave than are persons who face economic
h_ardships.

Yet from the data available, the movement of large numbers of
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people in and out of the several townships between 1870 and 1890 cannot be
validly and directly associated with expression of political discontent i n the
election of 1892.

N<;>r can it directly be related to economic conditions in

those townships.
As Table 19 shows, not all townships undergoing extreme population
changes between 1870 and 1890 showed Populist strength in 1892.

In Marion

County, as already mentioned, Carrigan, a non-Populist township showed a
greater population loss in the Eighties than did the Populist enclaves of Haines
and Raccoon, but less than the third Populist township of Meacham.

Similarly,

in Pike County, the non-Populist townships of Detroit and Martinsburg suffered
greater losses in population from 1870 to 1890 than did the Populist Montezuma
Township--but less than Hardin and Newburg townships, which were both areas
.

of third party strength.

.

The two Populist townships of Pearl and Spring Creek

reversed the traditional pattern and experienced tremendous growth during that
same period.

The lack of any relationship between population trends and voting

behavior can be statistically shown by Yule's Q, an easily figured, easily
interpreted measurement of association between two factors.

2

The value of

Yule's Q varies between +l. 000, for a perfect positive correlation between
the two variables, to a -1. 000 for a perfect negative or reverse relationship.
A value near or at zero shows no associ ation between the two variables; in
the case where the two variables are population growth or loss, and radical

2. For an explanation of Yule's Q as a statistical measure, see the
Appendix.
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or traditional politics, Yule's Q is zero, statistic ally verifying the lack of
correlation between the two factors.

Table 20 shows the calculations; the

townships are catagorized according to the last ta,ble .
TABLE 20
CORRELATION BETWEEN POPULA110N CHAN9E AND
VOTING BEHAVIOR I N SELECTED TOWNSHIPS OF
MARION Al\TD PIKE COUNTIES, ILI.JNOIS IN 1892

Pop-ul ist.
Population
Gain

Population
Loss

2
township

6
.township

Non-Popuris t

1
township

Q=(ad-bc)(ad + be)
Q=(2�3-G�1)(2J..3 + 61tl}
Q=(6-6)(6 +6)
Q=O .

3
township

But other methodological problems also are inherent in relating voting
behavior to the p,opulation data shown above in Table 1 9 .
shown in that table represent not chainges only.

The percentages

The actual movement of

people through the townships of the two counties could be much higher i n many
or all cases.

For example, although census figures for Montezuma Township

i n Pike County show only a nine percent population loss between 1870 and 1890,
very likely substantially more than nine percent of the township's population
actually moved during these twenty years.

The .figure in Table 1 9 does not

�!

,
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necessarily mean the same people lived there throughout the period.

Such

could be the case, but if the number of people leaving a township during a
decade was equalled by the number of people moving in, the net change i n
population would be zero, and the township would seem demographically
static.

The nine percent figure for Montezuma shows only that nine percent

more people left the township than entered it between 1870 and 1890.

Theor-

etically, it is possible that no person living in Raccoon Township in Marion
County in 1870 was still there by 1890, and that they all had been replaced by
new people.

Under such circumstances, Raccoon would be the least stable

township in Marion County, not the most stable, as Table 19 shows.

All

reason and evidence point to an actual gross population change much greater
than the net figures used in the table. In fact, a planned chapter on political
leaders in the townships of Marion County had to be abandoned when only
1 8 of 55 men so identified could be found in the manuscript census schedules

for 1880.

This unforfonate development further illustrated the high population

mobility in all townships studied, and probably in those not studied too.

Doubt:-

lessly, the actual movement of people in and out of Marion County townships
was much higher than the net figures in the table indicate.
Any relationship between population trends and voting patterns is equally
elusive when the economic factor of agricultural growth is also considered.
Table 21 specifies the relationship, or more accurately the lack of relationship,
between population and voting when an economic variable is introduced.

The

table below considers population growth in the light of agricultural expansion;
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TABLE 2 1
CHANGE I N PEH CAPITA LAND BAS.8 FOH SELECTED

TO\VNSH1PS I N' PIKE COUNTY, lLlJNOIS, 1870 TO 1890,

A �"D IN J:II ,'\ RION COUNTY, I LLINOIS, 1880 TO 1890

Per Capita Acres

1880

l\lurio11 County

Per C::ipita Acres

Net Change

1890

-0. 5 Acres

9. G

9. 1

16. 3

20. 8

Mcach::m.1

10. 5

14. 7

15. 7

20. 8

10. 5

12. 9

+2. 9

Tonti

1.5. 1

14. G

-0. 5

Carrignn
Haines

Haccoon

' •

:

1870

+4. 5

.

+4 . 2
+5. 1

Net Clumge

1890

,\· ·
.. ..

Pike Couf!.ty .
Detroit

10. G

Hard( n
Martinsburg

11 . 4 .

9. 1

14. 7

+5. 6
+4 . 5

9.4

Montezuma

8. 8

8. 8

Newb!.lrg

9. 9
--

Spring C reek

Source:

+8 . 2

3. 2

13. 9

Pearl

-0. 2 Acres

10.. 4

6. 7

0

18. �-

+8 . 4

4. 3

--

6. S

+0. 2

Assessors' Books for Carrigan, Meacham, and Tonti
townships for 1 8 7 9 and 1 8 9 2 , for Haines Township for
1878 and 1892, and for R accoon Township for 1879
1891;

and

Assessors' Books for Hardin, Newburg, and Spring

Creek tmvnships for 1873 and 1892; for Detroit

and

·

l\'Ia rtinsburg townships for 1874 and 1892, for l\Iontezuma
Township for 1874 and 1 8 9 1 , l:lnd for Pearl Township for

1 8 9 1 ; " Farm Areas and Farm Values , " Comnendium on the

Tenth Census (June

1 , 1 8 8 0 ) . Part I , pp. 697-698; " Number,

Acreage. and Valuation of F2rms and Products, with Cost
of Fertilizers , by Counties: Census of 189 0 , " Statistics of
.:b.griculture, ·1890.
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it tests the hypothesis that the effect of population ch�mges in the various
mitigated,

townships was
trends in

or else made more severe, by developmental

local agriculture.

Dividing

the figures

for

each

township's improved

acreage by its population, the table provides a per capita acreage

value

which,

when comparisons are made over time, weighs economic development by the
population factor. In other words, it standardizes all townships by population
and thus removes that factor as a variable to be considered in explaining
the

growth

or decline of agric ul tu re

in the

tow nships being studied.

once again, the only hypothesis proved by this examination is the

However,

null

hypothesis.

Population trends and the conditions which they might have caused apparently
were not instrumental' in shaping political attitudes.
In effect, Table 21 shows changes in the economic circumstances of
the townships

being studied.

Since they were predominatly agricultural, their

improved land and its products provided most of the support
population.

for

each township's

By m.easuring the per capita improved acres in each township,

comparative economic

levels

and changes

in

them over time can be determined.

For example, every man, woman, and child in Carrigan Township, Marion
County, theoretically was supported economically by
land in
12

by

·
1880 .

16. 3

acres of improved

Ten years later, although the township's population had declined

percent, the per capita economic land base had risen by
4. 5

acres.

the other

15. 6

27. 6

percent, or

'I\velve percent of this increase was due to the fewer people, and
percent to the fact that more land was in production. In Pike

County's Spring Creek Township, the· expansion of farming kept pace with the
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township's 5 8 percent population growth between 1870 and 1890, and the
per capita land base remained almost unchanged.

The outcome was the same

in Montezuma Township, also in Pike. county , although the population dropped
slightly over the twenty year period, because an equal percentage of land went
out of production.
Actually, a person who depended on the same or only a slightly larger
amount of producing land to support him in 1890 than he had in 1870 and 1880
probably was in worse shape finanCi ally in the Ninties than in the Eighties.
The drop in crop prices during the 1880's meant that produce from the same
amount of land provided an individual with less money to support himself.

How

much less cannot be measured here, for that depended on what crop his land
was producing and what the local m_arket prices actually were.

Besides, Table

21 only establishes each person's theoretical arithmetic share of the working
acreage i n his township, without regard to whether in reality it was wheat
land, or in oats or corn, or whatever.
The important information provided by the table is the comparison it
makes between townships in the same county at the same time.

The man,

woman, or child who was supported by 20. 8 acres of cropland was better off
than the individual in another township during the same year who only had a
12. 9 acre mathematical share of the fand for his financial support.

Unfortun

ately for this study, which is searching for a universal element to explain the
strength of the People ' s Party, the Populist townships in both counties we're
among the highest and also among the lowest in the number of acres mathematically
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supporting each member of the township's population.

Nor does the amount

or direction of change in that support base consistantly explain the incidence
of Populism in the townships of Marion and Pike counties.

The null hypothesis

again applies.
No figures exist to show adult male population at the township level.
However, enough other demographic information is extant to allow reasonably
accurate estimation of the adult male population for each of the townships being
studied, and once done, to permit comparison of their levels of political activity.
The census tabulations for 1870 to 1900 show, by counties, both the total
population and the number of males twenty-one years old and over.

A

rough

ratio of four-to-one exists between the total population of each county and its
number of adult males.

Specifically the percentages for Pike and Marion

counties in 1890 are 26. 7 percent and 25 . 1 percent, respectively. Multiplying
the total population of each township by these percentages produces a general
idea of the size of the electorate in each township.

Comparison of this estimate

to the number of votes cast in the 1892 election shows the two figures are
generally compatible.

Comparing them both to the number of persons reporting

personal property to the tax assessor in 1892 provides another check for
accuracy.

3

Tables 22 and 23 detail this relationship.

3. If the estimated adult male population is less than the number of votes
cast in the township in 1892 like in Tonti Township i n Marion County, or less than
the number of persons reporting personal property very likely something is
wrong with the estimate. This circumstance probably is an indication that the
township contained an unusually large number of older people--perhaps the
median age there was higher because of this--and hence .the percentage of adult
males was higher than in the other townships. Of course, another possibility
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TABLE 22
ESTil\lATED ADULT MALE POPULA'DON FOR SELECTED
.TOWNSHIPS OF MARION COUNTY, I LLlNOIS, FOR 1890
Estimated
Adult
Males

1892

774

194

166

146

1003

251

217

233

Total
Population

Township
C arrigan
Haines
Meacham
Raccoon
Tonti

Votes
Cast

1892

Personal
Property

790

198

164

188

1137

284

234

254

954

225

229

215

Assessors' Books for Carrigan, Haines, Meacham
and Tonti townships for 1892, and for R accoon
Township for 1891, and "Aggregate Population by
Minor Civil Division, " Compendium of the Eleventh
Census: 1890, Part I--Population , pp. 122, 124, 125,
and Centralia Sentinel, November 24, 1892.

Source:

Once the number of adult males in each township has been determined,
.

the degree of political involvement in the townships may be established.

Earlier

chapters have uncovered some strong, though few, relationships between
agrarian conditions in the various townships and the amount of third party vote
at the polls in 1892. In general, it has been fairly explicitly determined that
areas where the Populists did well i n the election were townships where an
unfortunate combination of conditions made farmers so discontented that large
numbers, either in protest or in despair, jumped in 1892 to a radical party
offering radical solutions for their economic ills.

However, no evidence

is vote fraud--"stuffing" the ballot box, or an individual casting more than
one vote. Similarly, a large discrepancy between the estimated adult males
and the votes cast and/or personal property owners may indicate a relatively
young township--younger farmers with l arge families. Such may be the case
with. Hardin, Pearl, and Spring Creek townships in Pike County.
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TABLE 23
·ESTIMATED ADULT MALE POPULATION FOR SELECTED
.TOWNSHI PS OF PIKE COUNTY, I LLINOIS, FOH 1890
1892

Estimated
Township

1892

Total

Adult

Votes

Personal

Population

Males

Cast

Property

Detroit

833

222

211

1 80

Hardin

1051

280

217

183

Martinsburg

1186

317

295

2 10

Montezuma

1360

363

339

318

Newburg

1060

283

256

201

Pearl

1256

336

236

239

424

331

308

Spring Creek
Source:

1590

Assessors' Books for DetroLt, Hardrn, Martinsburg,
.

.

Newburg, Pearl, and Spring Creek townships for

1892, and for Montezuma Township for 1 8 9 1 , and
"Aggregate Population by Minor Civil Division, "
Compendium of the Eleventh Census:

1890, Part I

--l>opulation, pp. 122, 124, 1 2 5 , and Pike Co:.inty
Democrat, November 1 6 , 1892.

exists that agrarian discontent politicized the

electorate,

a�

Table 24

shows.
While the electorate was extremely active in the election of 1892--as
illustrated by the unusually high turnout, by modern standards at the polls-no great groundswell mqvement developed in the hypersensitive Populist areas.
Any expectation, either by the Populists or by the historians who have studied
them, that deplorable conditions would stir the usually politically uninvolved
i�to action in 1892 was unrealized, at least in Marion and Pike counties. 4
4.

No accurate method exists to measure the 1892 turnout against the

1888 vote.

Although absolute voting figures are available, of course, any

attempt to compare the percent voting in 1892 with the 1888 figure would be
highly speculative, at best.

Even though the 1890 census is equi distant from

the two elections, and even though the general direction of population trends in
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TABLE 24
yOTES CJ\ST IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS OF 1888 Al\1D
1892 IN SELECTED TOWNSHIPS OF MARION Al\1D PIKE
COUNTIES, I LIJNOIS

1888

l\Totes Cast
[M arion

Carrigan

170

1892

Percent Voting*

87. 7

'

Votes Cast

Change in

Percent Voting

Percent Voting

166

85. 4

- 2. 3 . ·.

86. 4

+10. 2

Haines

191

76. 2

217

Meacham

162

81. 8 .

164

82 . 9

Raccoon

218

77. 7

234

82. 3

Tonti

190

84 . 3

229

--

--

--

Pike

+ 1.1
+

4. 6

:

Detroit

--

--

211

95. 0

Hardin

237

84. 7

217

77. 4

- 7. 3

Marti nsburg

281

88. 7

295

93. 3

4. 6

339

93 . 3

Montcznma

331

91. 2

Newburcr
t:>

2;60

91. 8

256

95. 5

Pearl

279

83. 2

236

70. 3

Spring Creek

308

72. 6

331

78. 2

*

+

+ 2. 1
+

3.7

-12. 9
+ 5. 2

See footnote 4 in this chapter, and also Tables 22 and 23

All the townships in Marion County appear equally active and, indeed, in Pike
County three of the Populist townships seemed relatively apathetic politically
when compared to their other Populist and non-Populist neighbors.

Both counties

the various townships between 1880 and 1890 is known, it cannot be assumed the
rate at which the population changed in each township was steady, or even that
it maintained the same direction throughout the entire decade.

Thus a

comparison of degree of political participation in the 1888 and 1892 elections,
using the 1890 population figures as the basis for calculating the percentage of
the electorate voting in each case, is of questionable validity, except as a
very, very rough estimate, with all the qualifications already mentioned.

'
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were poor counties in the Eighties and Ninties. The high overall percentage
of voters in all the townships well may reflect the generally depressed
economic conditions in the area.

But no relatively undistressed county has

been studied to provide a standard against which to measure the validity of
this theory.

If the perception of a Populist threat in any of these townships

aroused concern among Republicans and Democrats about the success of their
political organizations--apparant in Marion County newspapers, but not in
the Pike County pres s --thcy did not flock to the polls in those townships to
prevent it.

�ndeed, in Hardin, Pearl, and Spring Creek townships, Republicans

and Democrats, and maybe even some potential Populists, actually seem to
have stayed away from the polls.

Thus if the residents of Marion and Pike

counties, upset by economic conditions in 1892, were attracted by the presence
of a third party proposing radical agrarian ideas, or if they were sickened and
repulsed by such a party, they did not show their increased concern at the
polls--at least not i n most of the Populist townships.

Thus, while the People's

Party was strong in several townships of both counties, no evidence indicates
that persons ordinarily inert politically went to the polls to stop the radical
threat or, perhaps upset by conditions, to aid it.
But regardless of whether or not agrarian discontent was reflected by
increased voter turnout at township polling places, in general, population
factors show no cause and effect relationship with third party strength in the
townships studied.

Some Populist townships grew between 1870 and 1880

and 1890, others suffered varying degrees of population loss, some remained

118
the same.

Furthermore, non-Populist townships also exhibited these

same tendencies to roughly the same degrees.

Even when population changes

are considered in conjunction with the expansion or contraction of agriculture
in the various townships, no clear cut characteristics emerge to define and
separate the Populist areas from those where the third party did not run well .
in the election.

The size of the per capita land base providing financial support

for each township's residents varied greatly throughout all townships, Populist
and non-Populist.

So did changes in that economic base over time.

Indeed,

i f a common factor or characteristic can be found to explain the strength of
third party politics in some townships of Marion and Pike counties in Illinois,
it will not be a population characteristic.
proven the null hypothesis.

This chapter on population has

CHAPTER VIII
The People's Party i n Marion and Pike Counties: An Overview and Reassessment

Voting behavior always is difficult to explain and analyze.
voter seldom really knows why he votes the way he does.

The average .

He intuitively senses

that he likes or dislikes particular candidates or parties, often because he
supports or opposes the positions those candidates or parties take on issues
·which he deems important.

But he seldom considers, in a coldly analytical

way, just how his environment shapes his own positions on those issues. Indeed,
he generally does not realize the conditions which surround him both create
the issues vital to him and determine their rank in his hierarchy of importance.
Thus when the voter discusses his vote and reveals why he cast it, he is not
explaining reasons, but only his reaction to them.
The Pike or Marion County farmer who in 1892 might have explained his
vote for the Populists by attacking the inability of the Harrison administration to
alleviate the economic situation in his area was stating a manifestation, 'not a
reason.

He sensed the poor condition of agriculture, and its continuing economic

decline, and reacted against it in support of a political party promising to improve
his situation.

But the conditions which might have created his economic situation-

poor land, not enough land, low productivity, and low crop prices--actually
explain his vote, not the situation itself.
an important one.

This is a very subtle point, but also

Farmers in the Populist townships very likely rejected the
119
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moderate parties and embraced the radical one without being more than only
very vaguely aware how the condition of agriculture and what they were doing
about it differed from their neighbors' situation.
Farm mechanization is the key to explaining Populism in Marion and
Pike counties.

Almost without exception, i n both Marion and Pike, the townships

supporting the Populists were highly mechanized, and those which gave no
support to the third party were not.

The extensive use of machinery i n the

Populist townships likely indicates a committment to scientific agriculture
not found elsewhere in either county.

Furthermore, it illustrates the attempts

of some farmers to overcome the adversity imposed by topographic and
(

demographic conditions in their townships.

Adoption of mechanized techniques

was an effort to compensate for too m any people, or poor land, or not enough
land, or for a combination of these circumstances.

By using machinery to

a greater extent than did their neighbors, farmers in the radical political
areas hoped to increase the efficiency of operating farms which were too small
or too infertile to be productive enough to provide a decent living.

More

efficiency meant lower production costs and hopefully a higher profit--or at
least a profit of some kind.
Repeated estimates have been made of the saving in human labor and money
realized by adoption of agricultural machinery in the farming process.

For

example, wheat production; a good man with a sickle could reap, <h ind, and
shock over half an acre per day.

With a cradle scythe he could reap three acres
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per day, but to keep that pace his operation required three men to bind for
every two cradlers.

A mechanical reaper equalled four or five cradlers.

A self-raking reaper saved four to five men in cutting a ten to twelve acre
field.

After his initial investment for the machine was recovered, the farmer

began to save on the wages he otherwise would have paid hired hands. If
his farm was too small to require a large labor force in the first place--as
may well have been the case in some Populist townships of Pi:ke County--he
still enjoyed the advantage of being able to sow, and' harvest a large number of
acres than he and his family could have managed using only rudimentary farming
·
This was an important consideration for cereal crops such as were

methods.

grown in Pike and Marion counties, especially at harvest time.

The harvest

for small gains generally lasts about ten days, during which time the grain
is ripe enough to cut but not so ripe as to thresh out on . the ground during the
cutting.

For a small farmer this time limitation meant he could only plant
.

7 1/2 acres for each hand available at harvest time. But with a reaper he
could plant 135 acres and harvest it himself, if he desired.

1

The increased efficiency resulting from mechanization of agriculture in
the years after the Civil War saved manpower and time, and therefore money.
Fewer men could do the same job in less time.

By using disc gang plows ,

broadcast seeders, five section harrows and self-raking reapers , the work of
a man in a wheat field was eighteen times as effective as when the work was
done by hand. . In the case of cereal crops, the farmer realized a financial
1.

.

Shannon, Farmers' Last Frontier, pp. 140-44.
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savings ranging from 66 percent for corn to 80 percent for wheat over the
costs of production using crude methods.

This savings c.:>uld be implemented

either by reducing t1:1e payroll or by increasing the production of a fixed labor
force.

2

Table 25 shows the savings in hours of l abor needed to produce one

acre of the kinds of crops common to Marion and Pike counties.

However,

as well illustrated by the non-Populist townships of Marion and Pike counties,
TABLE 25
COMPARISON OF HOURS NEEDED TO PRODUCE AN ACRE
OF SELECTED CROP3 BY HAND A!'U) BY MACHINE

Hand
Hours M:inutes

Crop

Wheat
Corn
Oats
Hay: loose
Hay: baled

-

Source:

Machine
Hours Minutes

61

5.0

3

19. 2

38

45. 0

15

7. 8

66

15. 0

7

5. 8

21

5. 0

3

56. 5

35

30 . 0

11

34. 0

Fred A. Shannon, The Farmer's Last
Frontier: Agriculture, 1860-1897, p 143.
.

many farmers in the 1890 's were relatively unmechanized.

Partly because of

the traditional conservatism of agricultural areas but also because of the
expense involved, farmers continued to use highly inefficient production methods.
However, that was a luxury farmers i n some townships could not afford.
In Marion County, farmers in Haine�, Meacham, and Raccoon townships
f9µn.d their la�d tq be inferior to their neighbor's acreage.

2.

Shannon, Farmers' Last Frontier, p. 143.

This difference is
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reflected in the lower values assigned to it for tax purposes.

To compensate

for this disadvantage, and to provide a decent standard of living for their
families , these farmers undertook a dual program to expand the acreage they
had in production and to use machinery to farm their holdings more efficiently.
Consequently , they eiq)8nded their improved acreage by between thirteen and
twenty percent, well above their neighbors' expansion levels and, coupled with
modern agricultural methods and a general population loss during the Eighties,
increased their per capita economic base between three and five percent.
Some similar trends existed in the two non-Populist townships, but with
signific ant differences.

Land in Carrigan and Tonti was more valuable than

acreage in Haines, Meacham and Raccoon.
two townships were not marginal.

By comparison conditions in those

In fact, Carrigan Township also experienced

-

expansion in the Eighties.

But with better land to start, and with no real

financial committment to machinery, Carrigan farmers were in a much less
precarious position.

Of course they wanted to improve their condition, but

failure to do so held consequences less grim than for the more marginal and
heavily indebted farms committed to expansion i n Haines, Meacham , and Raccoon.
Tonti land was

equal to Carrigan in value.

But farmers there seemed more

concerned about increasing their livestock herds during the Eighties than in
putting more acres into production.

So they too had no investment in machinery

and implements to protect or recover.
3.

3

The changes noted for Marion County reflect data contai ned in Tables

5, 10, and 19, pages 71, 79, and 106, respectively.

The figures in Table 10,

showing a general and varied decline in the value of implements in each townships
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The situation in Pike County was strikingly similar.

Persons in

Montezuma, Newburg, Pearl and Spring Creek townships were faced with
a production problem much like the one afflicting Haines, Meacham, and
Raccoon townships i n Marion County.

However the Pike County farmers'

problem was not due to poor land in the same sense as in Marion, but
rather to a l ack of land on which to expand.

Farmers i n these Pike County

townships were working land as good as their neighbors '.
have enough of it.

They just did not

While the answer in Marion County had been a combination

of expansion and mechanization to overcome soil infertility by increasing
production, farmers in southeastern Pike had fewer alternatives.

Placing

new land in production just was not feasible in townships where that land
was hilly, broken, and heavily timbered.

In these Pike County townships

mechanization was the only answer, unless the residents wished to maintain
the status quo.

Modern agricultural techniques promised to lower per acre

production costs even if the farmers could not expand onto new acreage.

4

Farms in Detroit and Martinsburg, which did not support the People's
Party in 1892, were considerably larger than those in the Populist townships.
Their size, coupled with a significant population loss between 1870 and 1890
are difficult to interpret because they include such vari ables and unknowns as
age of machinery assessed--depreciation counted in figuring value--the number
of repossessions in the Eighties, the number of people leaving the township
and taking their machinery, the number and value of new machines purchased
during the decade, and the types of machinery and implements found in the
various townships.
4. Pike County statistics relevant to this paragraph arc found in Tables
13, 14, and 16, pages 93, 95, and 98, respectively. The inability of the river
townships to increase production by expanding i s ilJustratcd by the fact that
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mitigated the need to bring new land into production or to mechanize to
increase production on acreage already planted.

Indeed, similar developments

i n Newburg and Montezuma townships moderated the degree of mechanization
there also.

Both these areas had relatively flat good land which, except for

population losses of 31 and 9 percent between 1870 and 1890, would have been
developed.

But with little pressure to open new land, and with large farms

already, the need to mechanize was moderated.

Even in Detroit Township,

a population loss of 26 percent lessened the pressure for more efficient
production.

But Pearl and Spring Creek townships experienced increases

of 100 percent and 58 percent, respectively, during those two decades.

With

no good new land available, people were forced to modernize production as
the only alternative to create a better living standard.
Thus, mechanization of agriculture is the key to explaining support for
the People's Party i n Marion and Pike counties.

The people in the Populist

townships were attempting to shape their own destinies.

They refused to

surrender to the adverse economic conditions around them, and they had every
reason to hope for a bright future.

In Marion County residents of these townships

were opening new lands to production in an attempt at self-improvement.

In

both counties, farmers in these townships were adopting new and improved
methods of agriculture.

Although these solutions required heavy financial

investment and indebtedness , they created a revolution of rising expectations.
between 1872 and 1892 the biggest jump in improved acres was a 3 . 2 percent
increase i n Detroit Township.
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These poor farmers were taking a chance which their neighbors were too
frightened or too conservative or too apathetic to take.

They expected

it to pay off; they expected a better return for their efforts in the future
than they had been used to in the past. When agricultural prices continued
"
to decline throughout the Eighties, thus cancelling out the potential benefits
of their efforts, farmers of these poor but struggling townships became
increasingly frustrated.

Their failure to improve their situation despi te

concerted efforts must have been damaging psychologically as well as financially. 5
The climax of this situation came i n November 1892, and it took the form of
a large protest vote in the polling places of these townships.
The Populist movement provides fertile territory for social historians
and for psycho-history.

Farmers who readily accepted the agricultural rev-

olution following the Civil War developed a unique mind-set which ultimately
found expression in the People's Party in 1892. Such persons were receptive
to ideas and they were aggressive.

By accepting the mechanization of agriculture

they freed themselves from large amounts of spirit-deadening toil. They often
devoted the increased leisure time which resulted to social and political activity,
as first illustrated by the Granger movement.

Thus their aggressiveness and

energy was tr:anslated into the political arena as early as the 1870's.
5.

6

A great

The financial consequences of the agricultural collapse are noted for
highly mechanized areas in Shannon, Farmers' Last Frontier, p. 146.
6. Ibid. , p. 145, and Norman Pollack, The Populist Response to Industrial
America, Midwestern Populist Thought (New York: W.W. Norton and Co. , Inc . ) ,
pp. 3 , 4 .
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debate has arisen in Populist historiography in recent years.

Men like

Norman Pollack and Charles McArthur nestler have challenged the traditional
view of Populism first expounded by John Hicks in 1931 and generally accepted
thereafter.

Hicks considered the Populists to be utopian and reactionary.

He saw the Populist farmework as basically retrogressive--an attempt to
restore America to a simpler, more rural society.

Pollack and nestler

contend the movement was highly m aterialistic and pragmatic .

7

The evidence gleaned from this study of Illinois Populism at the township
level tends to favor the Pollack-nestler point of view.

Support for the People's

Party in Marion and Pike counties came from areas receptive to adoption
of modern farming methods, from areas where farmers seized the initiative
and tried to improve their situation.

In other townships, farmers continued

with business as usual; they made little if any effort to change the condition of
agriculture on their farms. In Marion, for example, residents of Carrigan
and Tonti townships were content with their high land values and relatively
rudimentary farming techniques.

They were willing to maintain the status quo,

and this desire was reflected in the 1892 election results from those townships.
But residents of Haines, Meacham and Raccoon townships already had
rejected the status quo, as had farmers in Montezuma, Newburg, Pearl and
Spring Creek townships in Pike County.

These people had already launched

an aggressive and heavily financed effort to alter their economic situation.
Hicks' interpretation is of course, The Populist Revolt; Pollack is
cited above in footnote 6 . The other work mentioned is nestler "Consumation
of a Labor-Populist Alliance, 1894 , " and is fully cited in footnote 4, p. 49.
7.
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By investing i n farm machinery and, in Marion County at least, by expanding
production, they confidently looked forward to better times.
times did not arrive, frustration and discontent set it.

When those

When their efforts

at self-help proved fruitless, and when their rising expectations were crushed,
they began to pay attention to the assertions of radical intellectuals and
politicians--assertions about distant forces controlling agriculture and about
manipulation of the economy by financial, commercial, and industrial interests .
They were not entirely unfamiliar with these cha:r:ges .

The railroads and

manufacturers had been targets of similar attacks in the Seventies and Eighties.
Like their Grange predecessors, these farmers let their energy, aggressiveness,
and pragmatism slip over into politics.
third party movements in the Eighties,

Although many had already voted for
8

declining conditions made even more

farmers receptive to radical agrarian ideologies in the Ninties.

In 1892, in

a combination of frustration and hppe, farmers in these highly mechanized but
struggling townships finally in large numbers declared their political independ
ence from their neighbors.

While the apathetic, conservative, unreceptive

farmers of other townships continued i n traditional ways--unmechanized
rudimentary farming and Republican or Democratic politics--residents of seven
townships in Marion and Pike counties cast votes for People's Party candidates.
Mechanization of agriculture is the key which ties these areas together in common.
But like the farmer who tries to explain his vote in terms of party policy,
mechanization_i_s. only the manifestation of a reason.

8,

See the Appendix for voting

tables .

The reason for the high
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incidence of Populism in these townships was the condition of agriculture
there, and the attitude of the residents to do something about it.

APPENDIX
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VOTE FOR PRESIDENT IN I LIJNOIS IN 1892

Counties
Adams
Alexander
Bond
Boone
Brown
Bureau
Calhoun
Carroll
Cass
Champaign
Christian
Clark
Clay
Clinton
Coles
Cook
Crawford
Cumberland
DeKalb
DeWitt
Douglas
DuPage
Edgar
Edwards
Effingham
Fayette
Ford
Franklin
Fulton
Gallatin
Greene
Grundy
Hamilton
Hancock
Hardin
Henderson
Henry
Iroquois
Jackson
Jasper

Cleveland
Democrat

Harrison
Republican

7, 746
1 , 674
1 , 328
518
1 , 567
3 , 555
840
1 , 444
2 , 203
4, 502
3 , 655
2 , 244
1 , 604
2 , 393
3 , 611
144, 604
1 , 875
1 , 785
- 1 , 926
2 , 083
1, 999
2, 154
3 , 164
677
2 , 744
2, 433
1 , 359
1 , 782
5, 253
1 , 675
3, 146
1 , 892
2 , 061
4, 132
700

6, 081
2, 053
1 , 659
1 , 994
879
3, 924
563
2 , 456
1 , 533
5, 290
2, 941
2, 181
1 , 774
1, 361 ,
3, 693
1 1 1 , 254
1 , 790
1, 470
3 , 789
2, 059
2, 246
2, 478
3, 197
1 , 350
1 , 472
1, 980
2, 227
1, 631
4, 948
1 , 211
1 , 967
2 , 159
1 , 505
3, 393
660

921
2 , 670
3 , 848

1 , 352
4, 265
3, 936

2 , 858
2 , 217

3, 031
1 , 519

Bidwell
Prohibition

Weaver
People's

471
19
237
137
85
378
29
170
119
544
316
128
85
57
203
3 , 858
54
106
489
120
134
274
15 5
74
125
152
207
75
242
69
152
201
58
292
12

186
61
77
52
315
324
146
107
81
80
419
655
424
114
97
1 , 6J.4
220
209
36
86
70
16
195
56
130
836
20
198
379
203
329
44
157

117
393
338
210
163

27
312
87
3 61
296

303
159
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Counties
Jefferson
Jersey
JoDaviess
Johnson
Ka ne
Kankakee
Kendall
Knox
Lake
LaSalle
Lawrence
Lee
Livingston
Logan
Macon
Macoupin
Madison
Marion
Marshall
Mason
Massac
McDonough
McHenry
McLean
Menard
Mercer
Monroe
Montgomery
Morgan
Moultrie
Ogle
Peoria
Perry
Piatt
Pike
Pope
Pulaski
Putnam
Randolph
Richland
Rock Island
Saline
Sangamon
Schuyler

Cleveland
Democrat
2 , 332
2 , 011
2, 793
854
5 , 778
2 , 763
848
3 , 073
1 , 964
9, 395
1 , 572
2 , 740
3 , 960
3 , 150
4, 303
5 , 051
5, 680
2 , 709
1, 834
2, 211
799
3 , 237
?, 311
6, 487
1, 748
1 , 975
1 , 611
3, 707
4 , 00 6
1, 670
2 , 244
8, 053
1 , 980
1 , 896
3 , 494
816
897
514
2, 702
1 , 542
4, 034
1 , 82 8
7 , 665
1 , 880 .

Harrison
Republican
1 , 949
1 , 313
2 , 680
1 , 716
7 , 977
3 , 577
1 , 619
5 , 800
2 , 932
7, 957
1, 523
3 , 513
3, 980
2, 619
4, 575
3 , 868
5, 355
2, 324
1, 590
1 , 614
1, 652
3 , 31 9
3 , 205
7 , 445
1 , 278
2 , 470
1 , 153
2, 935
3 , 471
1 , 287
3 , 939
7 , 266
1 , 840
2, 138
2 , 751
1 , 629
1, 662
561
2 , 425
1 , 500
5, 052
2 , 171

6, 009
1 , 563

Bidwell
Prohibition
147
115
138
108
719
203
277
384
202
520
161
163
421
300
551
337
280
262
92
190
43
304
263
769
133
135
7
344
275
65
283
284
156
129
225
16
30
55
221
121
340
59
779
149

Weaver
People ' s
806
76
129
419
353
39
28
331
31
191
106
61
184
87
95
288
354
532
18
19
148
243
31
63
115
107
108
171
195
264
33
321
193

23
1, 043
324
40
14
180
297
219
293
181
209
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Cleveland
Democrat

Counties
Scott
Shelby
Stark
St. Clair
Stephenson
Tazewell
Union
Vermilion
Wabash
Warren
Washington
Wayne
White
Whiteside
Will
Williamson
Winnebago
Woodford
Totals . . .

.

.

.

.

1 , 282
3 , 523
824
7 , 207
3, 717
3, 653
2, 663
5, 001
1 , 428
2, 294
1 , 868
2 , 372
2, 954
2, 779
6, 434
2 , 11 8
2, 634
2 , 601
426, 281

Harrison
Republican
1 , 006
2 , 304
1 , 240
6, 276
3, 574
3 , 030
1 , 427
6 , 892
1 , 112
2, 725
1 , 956
2 , 350
2, 215
3, 81 9
6 , 720
2 , 504
5, 854
1 738
399, 288

Bidwell
Prohibition
30
397
13 3
195
282
147
65
365
149
304
162
90
101
379
307
60
684
226
25, 871

Weaver
People' s
214
876
246
356
70
115
47
174
44
53
145
559
213
95
113
196
194
63
22, 207

Source: Official Vote of the State of Illinois Cast at the General Election Held
November 8, 1892 (Springfield, Ill. : H. W. Rokker , State Printer
and Binder, 1893), pp. 3, 4.
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PRESIDENTIAL VOTE IN MARION COUNTY, ILLINOIS, 1888 AND 1892
1892

1888
Township
Centralia 1
2
3
4
5
CentraJ City
Walnut Hill
Alma
Carrigan
Foster
Haines
Kinmundy
Meacham
Iuka
Odin
Sandoval
Omega
Patoka
Vernon
Raccoon
Romine
Salem 1
2
Stevenson
Tonti

R

D

281
192
244

143
117
143

11
10
29

x

x

x

x

67

x

61
76
54
60
116
32
102
124
110
62
75.
53
101
82
54
112
43
64

x

91

x

0

x

2

x

111
85
118
117
175
77

19
9
4
14
57
50

125
139
123
91
94
75
88
94
87
191
90
121

16
15
45
56
8
3
29
32
54
45
29
5

R

D

217
186
229
128

107
124
170
89

10
13
27
7

49

1 13

20
20
25
17
14 .
54
67
62
17
18
41
53
23
10
116
34
36
43
47
20

x

41
79
76
69
57 ·
133
.
32
131
143
123
64
92
60
-.70
78
93
71
41
66

x

29
129
73
108
106
191
70
140
169
114
114
97
82
48
. 103
124
162
104
143

0

x

Source: Centralia Sentinel, November 22, 1888 and November 24, 1892

134

PRESIDE NTI AL VOTE IN PIKE COUNTY, ILLlNOIS, 1888 AND 1892

Township
Atlas
Barry
Chambersburg
Cincinnati
Derry
Detroit
Fairmount
Flint
Griggsville
Hadley
Hardin
Kinderhook
Levee
Martinsburg
Montezuma
Newburg
New Salem
Pearl
Perry
Pittsfield
Pleasant Hill
Pleasant Vale
Ross
Spring Creek

R

253
287
37
10
81
64
99
40
258
125
66
134
24
115
95
146
123
53
195
290
71
135
37
82

1888
D
1-59
329
101
43
185
118
120
50
240
99
99
203
42
117
106
85
231
118
196
406
180
185
22
158

0

R

16
31
19
0
7
215 ?
3
6
340 ?
21
72
27
1
49
130
29
33
108
15
88
61
2
5
68

217
289
55
22
85
74
112
27 .
228
109
58
147
30
129
90
95
123
31

183
304
87
136
23
90

1892
D
202
312
99
73
190
105
113
57
230
100
65
228
72
111
100
60
232
71
186
415
160
167
16
125

0

24
48
17
9
18
32
10
15
162
36
94
33
2
55
149
101
46
120
41
53
68
39 .
20
116

Source: Pike County Democrat, November 15, 1888 and November 1 6 , 1892
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AN EXPLANATION OF YULE'S Q
Yule's Q is a means to statistically express the degree of association
between two dichotomous variables.

Literally, it measures the amount that

one characteristic or variable i nfluences the presence or absence of a second
characteristic or variable in a population of entities being studied.
from values of +1. 000 to - 1 . 000.

Q ·ranges

In the first case, the figure shows perfect

positive association, that the presence of one characteristic is related to the
presence of a second characteristic.

When Q i� at its negative maximum of

- 1 . 000, it means the presence of the first characteristic is related to the

absence of the second characteristic.

The decimal figures ranging between

these two boundarie s show the degree to which a positive or a negative association
between the two variables exists. In this study, the two variables for which
Yule's Q was employed were population gain or loss and voting behavior; the
subjects were the several townships.

In this particular case Q was zero, an

indication of no cause and effect relationship or association between the two
factors.
A fourfold table such as the one shown on page 108 is used to compute
Yule's Q .

All subjects exhibiting both characteristics (at pre-determined

. levels) are tallied in quadrant "a", i n the upper left corner of the table.

Those

showing the first characteristic but not the second are placed· in quadrant ' 'b"
in the upper right corner.

The subjects possessing the second characteristic,

but not the first one, are put i n section "c", in the lower left quarter, and
those subjects possessing neither variable are placed in 11d11 cell, in the lower
right corner on the table.

The following diagram shows this placement.
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a

b

c

d

By comparing the diagonal cells, one can observe the degree to which
possession of one ch.aracteristic influences the presence or absence of the
second variable..

The formula Q=(ad-bc) /(ad+bc) is used to mathematically

make this comparison.

If Q works out to be above a pre-determined absolute

value, usually around 0. 750 to 0 . 800, a strong association between the two
variables, be it positive or negative, is said to exist.
Another example of Yule's Q, i n addition to the one i n Chapter VII , might
be as follows: Suppose a comparison was being made between Populist voting
. in 1892 and the raising of wheat in the subject townships.

Let's say that of

eleven townships, six. had significant wheat crops and five d.id not.

Fu:rtther

suppose five of the six areas growing wheat were Populist townships and that
three of the ones growing little wheat were non-Populist in 1892.

Using P and

NP to signify voting behavior and W and NW for "wheat" and "no wheat" the

fourfold table would look like this:

p

w

5

1

NW

2

3
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Substituting the figures from the table's four cells into the formula produces a
value of +O. 765.

Thus, on the basis of Yule1s Q one could state a fairly strong

relationship exists in this sample case between planting wheat and voting the
Populist ticket in 1892.

Of course, interpretation of this relationship would

depend on the historian's traditional method and insight.

Quantitative measures

like Yule's Q are meant only to assist in interpretation, not to replace it.
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AN EXPLANATION OF SPEARMAN1S COEFFICIENT OF CORRELATION
The Spearman Coefficient of Correlation, abbreviated r ' i s a measure
s
of association between t\vo ranked variables.

Like Yule's Q its value ranges

between +1. 000 for perfect positive association to -1 . 000 for perfect negative
or inverse association.

Also like Yule's Q, Spearman values at or near zero

signify no relationship at all between the two variables.
However, Spearman's Coefficient is a much more sophisticated and
sensitive measure than is Q.

While Q measures only unranked dichotomous

variables, r considers the relative degrees to which the subjects possess
s
those characteristics, and ranks the subjects accordingly.

In fact, the coefficient

i s calculated from the difference in the rankings of each subject on each of the
two variables.

[

J , where ( D i s the sum of

2
2
The formula is r =1- 6 ( D /N(N -1)
s

differences in each subject's rankings for each characteristic, and N i s the total
number of subjects.
The example of wheat production and Populi sm,, used in the explanation
of Yule's Q serves not only to illustrate the application of Spearman's Coefficient,
but also to distinguish it from Q.

Ranking each township according to the per-

centage of Populist votes cast in 1892, with the township carried most decisively
by the People's Party placed first, produces rankings from 1 to 11; the lowest
rank i s assigned the township where the Populists did worst as a percentage of
the total vote cast.

Then ranking those same townships according to wheat

production, the highest producer ranked first, creates the followl.ng situation
b ased on this mythical data.
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TOWNSHIP

POPUUSM

WHEAT

D

D

10

100

A
B

1

11

2

10

8

64

c

3

6

3

9

D

4

5

1

1

E

5

4

1

1

F'

6

3

3

9

G

7

2

5

25

H

8

7

1

1

9

9

0

0

J

10

10

0

0

K

11

1

10

100

I

2

2

(D

N=ll

Placing figures into the formula produces a value for r
strong correlation.

s

=309

of +-0 . 407, not a

Careful examination of these rankings will determine

that the frequency of the two variables in the fourfold table of the Yule's Q
example _has be�n m aintained i n the computation of r 8; five of the seven Populist
townships (A to G) were among the top six wheat producers (from "a" cell of
the fourfold table), and three of the non-Populist townships (H to K) were low
wheat producers (from "d" cell of the fourfold table}.. Why then does the Q
measurement indicate a strong relationship between the production of wheat and
Populism, while the Spearman measure shows no relationship between the same
two variables.

The answer is found in the fact that Q does not discriminate

between different degrees in a variable which may exi.st between townships
occupying the same cell of a fourfold table.

The Spearman Coefficient, on the

other hand, ranks the t-oiimships by each variable and thus is a more sophisticated measure, although slightly more trouble to compute, than is Yule's Q .
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